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Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many working Americans receive little more than a salary or hourly wage from their 
employers.  Furthermore, although more than half of the workforce is fortunate enough to 
receive some employee benefits in addition to their pay, these benefits are hardly comparable to 
those received by corporate executives and other top management personnel.1  The benefits 
packages most employees receive consist of access to a health care plan, a retirement savings 
plan, and a life insurance policy.2  In contrast, executives typically receive a compensation 
package that not only includes a generous annual salary – at present, almost 400 times more than 
the pay of the average worker3 – but also includes some combination of the following:  
• short-term incentives (e.g., cash or stock bonuses),  
• long-term incentives (e.g., stock options), 
• qualified retirement plan benefits (e.g., a 401(k) plan),  
• nonqualified deferred compensation (i.e., an additional retirement plan),  
• perquisites (e.g., use of the company aircraft or country club memberships),  
• severance payments,  
• change in control (parachute) payments,  
• various types of insurance (life, medical, dental, split-dollar),  
• and a vast array of other types of compensatory benefits. 4  
 
                                                 
1
 For purposes of this article, the term “executive” refers to an individual belonging to a distinct class of 
employees.  This group includes not only a company’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) but also all its senior 
management personnel.  Executive, here, also refers to an executive of a publicly held corporation, unless otherwise 
stated.  The reason for the focus on publicly held corporations is in large part because the law discussed in this paper 
was generally designed to apply to public corporations.  Accordingly, the focus here is mainly on those corporations 
and their executives. 
2
 According to a survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in 2007, among private industry workers 
61 percent have access to an employer sponsored retirement plan, 71 percent have access to a medical plan, and 58 
percent have access to life insurance.  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: 
Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March 2007, at 7 tbl.1, 12 tbl.5, and 21 tbl.13 (2007), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0006.pdf.  
3
 See Pay Gap Between CEOs and Workers Now a Chasm, State News Service, June 8, 2007 ("[T]oday, the 
average CEO is paid nearly 400 times as much as the average worker."), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=275778.  For more information about pay ratios and their 
calculation, see generally Linda Levine, A Comparison of the Pay of Top Executives and Other Workers, 
Congressional Research Service, Apr. 13, 2004, available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context=key_workplace. 
4
 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 109th CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006) [hereinafter JCT COMPENSATION REPORT]. The composition of any particular 
executive’s pay package will depend on a variety of factors, such as the type of industry in which the executive’s 
firm is operating, the size of the firm, and the composition of competitors’ compensation plans.  See id. at 6-7 
(listing several factors as examples).  This is because most firms aim to offer compensation and benefits comparable 
to those offered to executives of other companies in the executive’s peer group, and an executive’s peer group is 
usually determined with reference to firm industry and size.  See, e.g., Bruce Greenblatt & Diane Doubleday, 
Executive Remuneration Perspective: A Responsible Executive Pay Peer Group Selection Guide, Apr. 5, 2007, 
available at http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.htm?idContent=1263170 (explaining use of peer groups to 
determine appropriate compensation).  
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Over the course of the last few decades, the media has publicized both the typical and 
atypical benefits offered to executives that are not extended to the average worker.  To highlight 
just a few examples, in 1996, Walt Disney Co. fired its president, Michael Ovitz, after only one 
year on the job, and paid him over $100 million to compensate him for the termination.5  When 
Jack Welch retired as CEO of General Electric in 2001, his retirement package included use of a 
corporate jet, a Manhattan apartment, and country club memberships.6  In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, Tyco International, Ltd. paid for its then-CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, to use and 
maintain an $18 million Manhattan apartment, including $6,000 for a shower curtain in the 
maid’s bathroom.7 
 
Reports of such extravagances and compensation levels often incite public outrage, 
especially when contrasted with the lifestyle, salary, and benefits of most other working 
Americans.8  Combine executives’ extravagant lifestyles, made possible by their generous 
compensation packages, with a good dose of corporate scandal or a turbulent economy, and you 
have one potent cocktail for political action.9  Since the 1980s, that political action has come, 
                                                 
5
 See Corie Brown, Managing Hollywood, Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1998, at 40 (discussing Ovitz's $100 million-
plus compensation for his “ill-fated year as president of the Walt Disney Co”); Bernard Weinraub, Hollywood’s 
Next Sequel: The Return of Ovitz, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1998, at C1 (noting severance Disney paid Ovitz “reached 
an extraordinary $100 million”). 
6
 See William A. Drennan, The Pirates Will Party On!  The Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules Will 
Not Prevent CEOs from Acting Like Plundering Pirates and Should Be Scuttled 17 (2008), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/william_drennan/3.  Other benefits included wine service, laundry service, and Boston 
Red Sox tickets.  See id. 
7
  See id.  Other items included a $30,000 pair of opera glasses, a $16,000 dog-shaped umbrella stand, and a 
$2 million birthday party for Kozlowski’s wife.  See id.  
8
 See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation -- A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937 
(1993).  Elson writes: 
Envy, for better or worse, is a fundamental part of the human condition. Whether we admit it or 
not, most of us take a keen interest in the financial status of our neighbors. Few aspects of 
existence in contemporary society create more anger, resentment and dissension than how much 
we are compensated for our daily toils in comparison to what our fellow workers earn. It is this 
simple fact, along with distributive justice concerns, that explain the cause of the extraordinary 
popular attention and fury directed at the seemingly innocuous issue of executive compensation.   
Id.  It is notable, however, that public resentment is not similarly directed at the compensation levels of other 
categories of highly paid individuals, such as entertainers or athletes.  See generally, CEOs Are Ridiculed for Huge 
Salaries: Why Aren't Athletes and Entertainers?, Knowledge@Wharton, Nov. 19, 2003, available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=877 (asking why athletes and entertainers who make as 
much as CEOs are not similarly criticized); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a 
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 201 (1996) ("[T]he public outcry that accompanies 
stories on CEO pay has no parallel in sports or cinema, where lavish compensation is hardly unknown.").  Several 
commentators have suggested that the difference lies in the extent to which the public perceives the compensation to 
have been bargained for at arms length or tied to performance.  See, e.g., id. (“People feel, instinctively, that if a 
movie studio pays a star $10 million for a single motion picture, the star must be worth that much, but the public is 
skeptical that the studio's CEO is worth $10 million for serving in that capacity for the year.”); Nicholas D. Kristof, 
Op-Ed., Millions for Moochers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A15 (“Athletes and movie stars are paid ridiculous 
sums as well, of course, but at least they earn them in arm's-length negotiations.”). 
9
 See Kenneth M. Rosen, “Who Killed Katie Couric? And Other Tales From The World Of Executive 
Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2907 (2007-2008)  (discussing scandal-driven reform and noting that 
“[w]ith average Americans perturbed about executive pay, government officials are acting to assuage that anxiety”); 
Thompson, infra note 140. 
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inter alia, in the form of legislation attempting to influence corporate behavior (and thereby 
executive compensation levels) through the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).10   
 
The Code is often used not only as a means of raising revenue, but also as a means of 
implementing social policy.11  With regard to the latter, the Code contains various provisions that 
are designed to reward taxpayers for engaging in certain desired activities and penalize them for 
engaging in certain seemingly undesirable activities.12  To discourage taxpayer conduct, 
Congress enacts provisions that alter what would otherwise be the normal operating tax rules in 
order to penalize the targeted conduct.13  Such penalty provisions may, for example, disallow or 
limit a deduction or impose an additional tax with the aim of increasing the after-tax cost of the 
undesirable activity.14  The theory is this increased cost will discourage taxpayers from engaging 
in the conduct.15  It is important to note, however, that the Code does not prohibit or permit 
                                                 
10
 All section references, unless otherwise stated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder.  A question that might be raised at this point is whether the 1980s is an 
appropriate reference date inasmuch as section 162(a)(1), which imposes a reasonableness limit on compensation 
deductions, was enacted before the 1980s.  Note 90, infra, explains why this article treats section 162(a)(1) 
differently than the other Code provisions discussed herein. 
11
 See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) (assessing logic of using tax laws 
to accomplish policy goals).  See also generally Susan Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive 
Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81 (1998) (discussing tax laws that were not enacted to raise revenue but to 
police executive compensation). 
12
 See generally Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989) (discussing rewards and penalties in income tax system).  See also generally Kurt 
Hartman, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate 
Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159 (1994) (same).  
13
 The phrase “normal operating tax rules” is used in this article to refer to the already existing rules that 
would apply to determine the tax consequences in the absence of a subsequently enacted rule clearly disallowing 
that treatment or prescribing different treatment in order to penalize the taxpayer; it is not meant to refer to a 
comparison of current rules to a normative income tax.  Cf. Zolt, supra note 12, at 348 (avoiding identification of tax 
penalty provisions by reference to deparatures from a “normal” income tax structure and instead identifying tax 
penalties by their function); Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, Rethinking Tax 
Expenditures, May 1, 2008, at 9, available at http://www.house.gov/jct/Rethinking_Tax_Expenditures.pdf (“[I]n 
many cases, it is not possible to identify in a neutral manner the terms of the ‘normal’ tax to which present law 
should be compared.”).  The penalizing provisions that are the focus of this article are referred to as tax penalties, 
even though they are not labeled as such by the statute, because they operate as penalties and are not aimed at 
measuring a taxpayer’s net income or raising revenue.  See infra Part III.B.  As discussed in Part III.B, their function 
and nature are inherently penal.  In other contexts, this has been sufficient for the Supreme Court to treat certain tax 
provisions as imposing a penalty even though they were similarly not labeled as penalties by the statute.  See United 
States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 226 (1996) (looking “behind the label placed 
on the exaction and rest[ing] its answer directly on the operation of the [tax] provision”). 
14
 See Zolt, supra note 12, at 343-44.  Other methods of discouraging taxpayer conduct include “deny[ing] 
favored tax statuses, . . .  or, disallow[ing], limit[ing], or postpon[ing] tax credits.”  Id. at 344.  In general, the Code 
imposes tax penalties on two types of taxpayer activities:  (1) illegal activities, and (2) undesirable activities. See id.  
This article focuses on the latter type. 
15
 See id.  Conversely, to encourage taxpayer conduct, Congress enacts provisions that confer “deductions, 
credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates.” Surrey, supra note 11, at 706.  See also Zolt, supra 
note 12, at 343 ("Congress encourages good conduct by providing special tax statuses, rates, exclusions, deductions, 
or credits.").  These types of provisions operate to reduce the costs of engaging in certain activities, in theory making 
those activities more attractive to taxpayers.  See id.  In this way, the federal government foregoes taxes that it would 
otherwise collect and have available to spend.  See Hartmann, supra note 12, at 169 ("[A] tax [benefit] serves as the 
functional equivalent of a direct government subsidy for the particular activity.").  Forty years ago Stanley Surrey 
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nontax behavior; the Code can only provide how certain items are to be taxed, and thereby 
influence nontax taxpayer behavior.16 
 
Congress has enacted several tax penalty provisions since the 1980s designed in 
particular to influence executive compensation practices.17  They were enacted, in part, to 
respond to the furor of rank-and-file Americans18 over executive excesses by attempting to rein 
                                                                                                                                                             
called these types of provisions “tax expenditures” precisely because they are “special provisions of the federal 
income tax system which represent government expenditures through that system to achieve various social and 
economic objectives.”  Surrey, supra.  It should be noted, however, that a number of commentators are critical of the 
utility of the tax expenditure label.  See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE 
L.J. 451, 519 (2004) (“There are those who dispute in general the utility of the tax expenditure label”) (citation 
omitted); Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Rethinking Tax Expenditures 8, Address 
Before the Chicago-Kent College of Law Federal Tax Institute (May 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/Rethinking_Tax_Expenditures.pdf (proposing a new approach to classifying tax 
provisions as tax expenditures that is aimed at responding to the criticisms of traditional tax expenditure analysis); 
Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1187 (1988) (discussing some of the 
academic criticisms of the tax expenditure label). 
16
 The Code does prohibit tax-related behavior, such as engaging in tax fraud. 
17
 See infra Part III.B discussing sections 280G and 4999, section 162(m), and section 409A.  Prior to the 
mid-1980s, tax law did not attempt to directly influence executive compensation practices.  See infra notes 46-50 
and accompanying text.  With regard to some of the tax penalty provisions enacted since then (sections 280G and 
162(m)), Professor Susan Stabile has identified and analyzed the following possible overarching legislative goals: 
(1) “a desire to affect the amount or type of compensation paid to executives;” (2) a “desire to affect the relationship 
between executive compensation and the pay of rank and file employees;” and (3) a desire to raise revenue.  See 
Stabile, supra note 11, at 95-100. 
18
 For purposes of this article, a rank-and-file American is any American belonging to a household with 
income of $250,000 or less.  Even though the average American household only has an income of $50,233, 
proposals designed to “tax the rich” often are aimed at those making $250,000 or more.  See Carmen DeNavas-Walt, 
Bernadette D. Proctor & Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-235, at 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf (calculating real median household income in 2007); Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13202 (adding the 36% and 39.6% tax brackets during the 
Clinton administration, of which the latter generally applied to taxpayers with taxable income over $250,000); 
Katherine Lim & Jeffrey Rohaly, The Impact of the Presidential Candidates’ Tax Proposals on Effective Marginal 
Tax Rates, Tax Policy Institute, Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, Sept. 30, 2008, at 13, available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411759_candidates_tax_proposals.pdf (noting Barrack Obama would 
raise payroll taxes on wages and salaries above $250,000); David Leonhart, For Democrats, Instincts Differ On 
Economics, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at A1 (noting Hillary Clinton’s campaign promise to raise taxes on those 
making over $250,000 a year); Leslie Wayne, Edwards Proposes Raising Capital Gains Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
2007, at A19 (describing John Edwards’ proposal to raise capital gains tax rate for those with incomes over 
$250,000 a year). 
It is important to note, however, that just as Americans with incomes of $250,000 or less are not all equal, 
Americans with incomes above $250,000 are not all equal: they are all quite well off, but some are only “merely 
rich” and not “super-rich.”  And, although there is a substantial gap between America’s lowest-income working 
population and its highest, “the income gap between the [super-rich] households and the rest can only be described 
as massive.”  Edward N. Wolff & Ajit Zacharias, Class Structure and Economic Inequality, Working Paper No. 487 
(Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 2007), available at, http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_487.pdf (referring to 
households with “nonhome wealth of at least $4 million or business equity worth at least $2 million”).  See also, 
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993 (2004).  
These days, even the super-rich are being left behind by the “ultra-rich.”  According to a recent survey by 
Fidelity, “just 8 percent of millionaires think they're ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ wealthy, while 19 percent don’t feel rich 
at all.”  10 Things Millionaires Won't Tell You, Yahoo! Finance, Aug. 26, 2008, available at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/banking-budgeting/article/105626/10-Things-Millionaires-Won't-Tell-You.  Apparently, it 
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in and shape executive compensation packages.19  But tax legislation attempting to control 
executive compensation has not reduced overall compensation levels or achieved other 
legislative goals.20 
 
This article adds to the literature assessing the use of tax penalties to regulate 
compensation paid to executives.21  Although legal scholars have considered whether such 
legislation is effective in meeting stated legislative goals, the literature has not focused on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
takes $23 million to feel truly rich.  See id.  In any event, most of the executives that the tax penalties discussed in 
this article are aimed at receive over $250,000 in total compensation annually, removing them from the rank-and-file 
class (and many belong to the super-rich or ultra-rich classes). See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money 
Rules: Behind Soaring Executive Pay, Decades of Failed Restraints; Instead of Damping Rewards, Disclosure, 
Taxes, Options Helped Push Them Higher; Return of Golden Parachutes, WALL ST. J. Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (“The 
average [pay in 2005 for CEO’s of large companies] was $10.5 million, a figure that includes salary, bonus and the 
value of stock and stock-option grants.”). 
19
 One scholar has noted that there are generally two varieties of outrage over executive compensation: (1) 
populist outrage over salaries that are considered too high (and thus inherently wrong), and (2) shareholder outrage 
over “ineffective compensation structures.”  Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 
U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 725-29 (1995).  But this line has been blurred, see discussion infra Part IV.  Presently, the 
compensation levels of oil company executives and mortgage lending company executives are center stage in the 
media and the focus of congressional hearings as the public blames them, in part, for the high price of gas and for 
the significant increase in home mortgage foreclosures.  See Executive Compensation II: CEO Pay and the 
Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Oversight and Govn’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008), 
preliminary transcript available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080422110749.pdf; Exploring The 
Skyrocketing Price of Oil:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008), transcript available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:43354.pdf. 
20
 See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive 
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 410, 417 (2008) (noting section 162(m) “was not effective in 
curtailing excessive executive salaries” and also noting the limited effectiveness of section 280G); Drennan, supra 
note 6, at 5 (demonstrating “the failure of 409A” to effectively regulate nonqualified deferred compensation); 
Hankinson, supra note 127 at 783-89 & nn. 108-146 (highlighting examples of ways §§ 280G and 4999 can be 
circumvented); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the 
Market for Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 178-87 (1993) (arguing 
against use of tax penalties to regulate market for takeovers and noting their weaknesses in discouraging conduct); 
Michael J. Hussey, Has Congress Stopped Executives From Raiding the Bank?  A Critical Analysis of I.R.C. § 409A, 
75 UMKC L. REV. 437, 439 (2006) (concluding “§ 409A does not adequately address the perceived abuses 
regarding nonqualified deferred compensation.”); Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended 
Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1680 
(2004) (concluding “the federal government will not be successful in capping executive compensation by providing 
disincentives through the tax code”); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884 (2007) (evaluating efficacy of section 162(m) and concluding it is likely 
ineffective); Stabile, supra note 11, at 94-100 (1998) (“[N]either with respect to ordinary compensation nor with 
respect to compensation contingent on a change in control has the Code proven a very meaningful curb on executive 
compensation.”); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 128-
29 (2001) (arguing for repeal of the golden parachute provisions because they “not only allow[] golden parachutes to 
flourish, but achieve[] this counter-productive result in a complex and costly fashion”); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 
5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 131, 187-92 (1990) (concluding, in part, that the golden parachute provisions – sections 
280G and 4999 – “satisfy none of the tests for identifying an appropriate tax provision”). 
21
 This article does not discuss or take a position on whether executives are overcompensated or whether 
executive compensation is an appropriate subject of government regulation.  For a discussion of those issues, see 
generally Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) 
(evaluating “the principal empirical and theoretical issues surrounding executive compensation”). 
  
 7 
important question of who bears the economic burden of these tax penalties.22  This article fills 
that void by exploring those costs, especially in the context of our national retirement savings 
policies and their evolving emphasis on the importance of diversifying capital ownership through 
the growth in defined contribution plans.  It shows that tax penalty provisions are a particularly 
inappropriate policy tool for regulating executive compensation because they are easy for 
executives to contract around, causing the penalties to ricochet in unintended directions.  This 
article provides a deeper analysis of who bears the burden of these penalties, and reveals that, 
notwithstanding the uncertainty which surrounds the economic literature on the incidence of 
increased costs to corporations, the burden likely falls on rank-and-file Americans to a 
substantial extent and does not significantly fall on the executives that Congress was targeting 
with the penalties.  The burden thus largely falls on individuals that the tax penalties were not 
meant to penalize.   
 
This identification and humanization of the affected individuals, in particular the 
recognition that rank-and-file Americans are impacted, helps to reframe the traditional discourse 
on how Congress and administrative agencies should regulate executive compensation, and why 
it is important from a tax policy perspective to reconsider this role of the Code.  It is also of 
timely significance as Congress has recently been considering expanding some of these tax 
penalties in an effort not only to curtail executive compensation levels but also to raise much 
needed federal revenue, which was not a goal of prior legislation.23 
 
To this end, the article proceeds as follows.  Part II discusses the core fact that, when it 
comes to paying taxes, the person nominally making the payment is not always the person who is 
really forfeiting the money and thereby bearing the financial burden of the payment.  Similarly, 
the person on whom the Code imposes the tax is not always the person that bears its financial 
burden.  This part demonstrates that to assess who is bearing a tax burden, it is necessary to look 
past both of these factors. 
 
                                                 
22
 See supra note 20.  The literature has largely assumed, with little if any discussion, that shareholders bear 
the burden.  See Conway, supra note 20, at 421-22 (“Congress has failed to rein in executive compensation through 
the tax code and the failure resulted in executives receiving even larger amounts of compensation. . . .  Ultimately, 
shareholders bear the cost.”); William A. Drennan, Enron-Inspired Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules: “If 
You Don’t Know Where You’re Going, You Might Not Get There, 73 TENN. L. REV. 415, 503 (2006) (“the [section 
162(m)] penalty for violating the $ 1 Million Cap falls on the corporation (and indirectly on the shareholders), and 
not on the overpaid executive”); Murphy, supra note 19, at 740 (“Inevitably, it will be the shareholders, and not the 
executives, who are punished.”); Stabile, supra note 11, at 88 n.22 (noting potential effect of 162(m) deduction 
limitation could be “double hit to shareholders”); Wolk, supra note 20, at 181 (“So what started out as a means to 
protect shareholders from rapacious executives has become an added government-imposed financial burden on those 
very same shareholders.”).  But see Polsky, supra note 20 (examining whether the incidence of increased executive 
compensation costs as a result of §162(m) falls on executives or companies, and concluding it likely falls on 
companies). This article unpacks that assumption and examines whether and to what extent, if any, others may bear 
the burden, paving the way for a new line of critique on the use of tax penalties to regulate executive compensation.  
In a future article, I plan to head down that path and examine the sociopolitical context for enactment of these 
penalties and the resultant cyclical process of tax legislation regulating executive compensation.  I will consider why 
Congress continues to enact tax penalties on executive compensation when there is general agreement in the 
scholarly literature that such provisions are largely ineffective at controlling corporate behavior and are inefficient as 
well. 
23
 See infra note 199 and accompanying text (noting that executive compensation tax penalties were not 
enacted to raise revenue) and note 295 (legislative proposals). 
  
 8 
Part III focuses on where the Code nominally imposes the burden and the benefit of taxes 
associated with employee compensation.  It first sets forth the rules governing the taxation of 
compensation in the absence of tax penalties that could alter the consequences under those rules.  
Part III next examines, in chronological order, the functionality of the tax penalty provisions that 
have been enacted to shape executive compensation: sections 280G and 4999 which apply to 
golden parachute payments, section 162(m) which applies to annual compensation, and section 
409A which applies to nonqualified deferred compensation.  
 
These penalties come in two forms: a denial of a deduction to the company for 
compensation it pays or the imposition of additional taxes on the compensation an executive 
receives.  As to the former, many companies have reacted by modifying their compensation 
practices, but almost all evidence indicates that they did not do so in the way Congress 
envisioned.  In the end, many companies continue to authorize large executive compensation 
packages that result in the imposition of significant tax penalties.  As to the penalties imposed 
directly on the executive, this part also shows that they are ineffective because they can be 
contracted around through so-called “gross-up” agreements and other compensation measures.  
In this way, the executive can avoid bearing the financial burden of the penalties, but in doing so 
increases the company’s compensation costs. 
 
A company, however, cannot bear the financial burden of the penalties imposed on it or 
other increases in its costs.  Only natural persons can bear the economic burden.24  The question, 
then, is who bears the economic burden of the penalties.  This is the focus of Part IV.  As 
explained therein, increased corporate expenses due to tax penalties lower the corporation’s 
after-tax profits (and hence the shareholders’ return on equity) unless the burden is shifted 
elsewhere and thus offset.25  The only other options are to shift the cost to consumers through 
higher prices or to workers through reduced wages or layoffs, or some combination thereof.26  In 
sum, the economic burden of these tax penalties is either borne by shareholders, owners of 
capital, consumers, or workers. 
  
The costs of these tax penalties are effectively an indirect (or hidden) tax on the 
individuals who ultimately bear the economic burden of the penalties.  If the executives who are 
the target bore the burden in the form of reduced before or after-tax compensation, then the 
penalties would be successful in penalizing the appropriate individuals.  As mentioned above, 
however, many targeted executives are able largely to shift the burden to others.  In that way, the 
penalties miss their mark.  If they are redirected toward other super-rich Americans then, under 
an ability to pay theory of taxation, policymakers should arguably be less concerned about the 
harm produced than if they were borne to some degree by those who are less well off.27  But, 
Part IV goes on to show that rank-and-file Americans bear a portion of the economic burden.  
Thus, the costs of the penalties are effectively a tax increase on them.   
 
                                                 
24
 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
25
 As discussed in Part IV.C., a lower return on corporate equity could result in all capital owners bearing the 
burden of increased corporate expenses in the long run under an equilibrium economic incidence model. 
26
 These affected categories, as discussed in this article, include vendors and other non-employees that 
provide services to a corporation. 
27
 In this context, “harm” means bearing the economic burden of the penalties. 
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The risk that tax penalties on executive compensation are not only ineffective, but also run 
counter to other important domestic policies, in addition to harming one or all of the intended 
beneficiaries of these regulatory measures, means that they are an inappropriate policy tool that 
should no longer be used.28  This does not mean, however, that the federal government should 
not pursue methods of controlling executive compensation if that is deemed a desirable goal: 
only that it should aim better to hit its intended target.  Part V concludes with a few comments 
and suggestions in that regard. 
 
II.  TAX BURDEN: THE REAL PAYOR VERSUS THE NOMINAL PAYOR 
 
When it comes to paying taxes, the person nominally making the payment is not always 
the person who is really forfeiting the money and thereby bearing the financial burden of the 
payment.29  It is thus necessary to look past the nominal payor to ascertain “where the burden of 
taxes lies.”30  It is also necessary to look past the person on whom the tax is imposed in the first 
instance.31   
 
In looking beyond the tax exterior, one of three situations is generally revealed.  The first 
is the most transparent:  the person who makes the payment is also the person on whom the Code 
imposes the tax and that same person bears the financial burden as well.  A simple example is 
where a single individual, who is not a business proprietor, owes income tax to the federal 
                                                 
28
 In other words, the premise behind a Pigouvian-type of tax is that it will correct a negative externality of a 
market activity or, at least, raise revenue that can be used to respond to the negative externality.  With regard to the 
former, if a penalty has little to no corrective effect, and yet at the same time creates negative unintended and 
counter-productive effects, then Congress should repeal such a provision.  This argument, accordingly, does not 
necessarily mean that tax penalties as a general proposition should never be used, or even that they should not be 
used if borne to some extent by innocent parties.  It does mean that tax penalties should only be used where they are 
effective to a substantial extent in meeting their intended purpose.  Some would go even further and argue that “tax 
penalties are policy tools that Congress should grasp only in exceptional cases: when it can establish that the 
advantages of using the tax system outweigh the limitations inherent in tax penalty provisions.”  Zolt, supra note 12, 
at 344, 373 (“Tax penalties are simply too blunt an instrument to approximate the optimal fines required to deter 
efficiently.”).  
It is generally beyond the scope of this article to discuss the use of tax penalties on executive compensation 
to raise revenue to counteract the negative effects of the targeted undesirable activity.  Nevertheless, the first issue 
that arises is identifying the specific negative effects Congress was aiming to correct.  This will be explored in a 
future article.  See supra note 22.  Assuming, for now, that growing income inequality was at least one of the 
motivations for these provisions, then it would appear that, at a minimum, the revenue collected from these penalties 
is not having a significant countervailing effect as evidence indicates that income inequality continues to grow at an 
accelerating rate. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 
993 (2004) (exploring evolution of income inequality); Jason Bordoff & Jason Furman, Progressive Tax Reform in 
the Era of Globalization: Building Consensus for More Broadly Shared Prosperity, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 327, 
360 (2008) (“In the past several decades, except for the latter half of the 1990s, the gains of our nation’s growing 
prosperity have not been broadly shared but have rather accrued largely to those at the very top.”); Chye-Ching 
Huang & Chad Stone, Average Income In 2006 Up $60,000 For Top 1 Percent Of Households, Just $430 For 
Bottom 90 Percent, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Report, July 30, 2008, at 1 (“[T]he shares of the nation's 
income flowing to the top 1% and top 0.1% of households were higher in 2006 than in any year since 1928”). 
29
 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 
74-75 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter TAXING OURSELVES] (discussing ambiguity over who bears the burden of paying 
taxes). 
30
 Id. at 74. 
31
 See id. 
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government after filling out an annual income tax return, and then writes a check to the U.S. 
Treasury for the amount owed, mailing it to the IRS with her tax return.  In this case, the Code 
imposes the income tax on her, she is the one to pay it nominally, and it is her money that is 
forfeited in payment.32 
 
The second type of situation is less transparent, but relatively easy to analyze.  Here, the 
person who makes the payment is not the person on whom the Code imposes the tax. 
Nevertheless, the person on whom the tax is imposed is the one to bear its financial burden.  For 
example, when an employer withholds money from an employee’s paycheck and forwards it on 
to the IRS as payment of income tax, the employer is neither paying its own income tax nor 
forfeiting its own money to pay someone else’s income tax.33  Nominally, the employer is the 
one paying the income taxes to the IRS, but really the employer is facilitating the payment of the 
employee’s income tax obligation.34  The employer does this by taking (“withholding”) the 
employee’s funds and remitting them to the IRS on behalf of the employee.35  In this way, it is 
the employee who has less money after paying the income tax that the Code imposes on her.  
 
The third type of situation is the most obscure.  In this case, the person who nominally 
makes the payment may or may not be the person on whom the Code imposes the tax.  Either 
way, the person on whom the tax is imposed does not ultimately bear its financial burden.  
Instead, the burden is shifted to others. 
 
A classic example of this third situation is the payroll tax system.  The Code imposes 
payroll taxes on both the employer and the employee.  Under the most prominent payroll taxes, 
the social security tax and medicare tax (combined, the “social security taxes”), each party must 
pay an amount equal to 7.65 percent of the individual employee’s wages paid during 2008 up to 
$102,000, and 1.45 percent of wages above that level.36  For example, an individual earning 
$100,000 would pay $7,650 to the federal government, and her employer would also pay $7,650, 
for a total payment of $15,300.   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Code imposes payroll taxes on both the employer and 
employee, it is widely believed that “workers in competitive labor markets bear through lower 
                                                 
32
 See I.R.C. § 1(c) (imposing income tax on unmarried individuals). 
33
 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This The Easy Way or The Hard Way:” 
Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 199 (2006) (discussing employers’ 
withholding of income tax from paychecks).  See also I.R.C. § 3402 (“[E]very employer making payment of wages 
shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax . . . .”). 
34
 See, e.g., TAXING OURSELVES, supra note 29 at 75 (discussing method whereby employer withholds 
income taxes from employee’s paycheck and sends to IRS on behalf of employees); Edward J. McCaffery, The 
UCLA Tax Policy Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1879 (1994) (discussing law 
requiring employer to withhold employee’s share of income tax from paycheck). 
35
 See McCaffery, supra note 35, at 1879. 
36
 See I.R.C. § 3101 (imposing social security (OASDI) and medicare (HI) taxes on employees); I.R.C. § 
3111 (imposing social security (OASDI) and medicare (HI) taxes on employers); Social Security Administration 
News Release (October 17, 2007) available at http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/2008cola-pr.htm. (announcing that  
the taxable wage base for the social security tax in 2008 is $102,000).  For the definition of “wages” and 
“employment,” see I.R.C. § 3121(a)-(b).  
  
 11 
wages the cost of all payroll taxes, including the employer’s share.”37  In this way, it is the 
employee who has less money after the employer pays its payroll taxes, not the employer.  
Following on the above example, this belief is premised on the theory that the employer would 
be willing to pay the employee up to $107,650 in a world where there are no social security 
taxes.  However, in the presence of a 7.65 percent tax imposed on employers, it would only be 
willing to pay the employee up to $100,000, as it would also have to pay $7,650 to the 
government.38  In that way, the employer shifts its burden of paying social security taxes to the 
employee.  “The phenomenon that taxes that are ostensibly levied on one group of people may 
end up being borne by others is known as tax shifting, and who ultimately ends up bearing the 
burden is called by economists tax incidence.”39   
 
To extend this discussion of tax shifting and tax incidence a step further, note that 
artificial legal entities, such as corporations, can act only through natural persons.40  As such, a 
corporation cannot bear the burden (or the incidence) of taxes; only natural persons can bear the 
economic burden.41 That raises the question of which individuals bear the burden of taxes 
imposed on artificial legal entities.  The answer to that question will be discussed in Part IV, in 
the specific context of assessing who bears the financial burden of tax penalties imposed as a 
consequence of executive compensation practices.  The next section focuses on where the Code 
nominally imposes the burden of taxes associated with compensation.  
 
                                                 
37
 Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned 
Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225, 290 (1994) (citing C. Eugene Steuerle & Paul Wilson, The 
Taxation of Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 34 Tax Notes 695, 700-01, n.11 (1987)).  See also President’s 
Advisory Panel On Tax Reform, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 29 
(2005), available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/ [hereinafter Tax Reform Report] (noting that “the 
burden of the employer’s portion of the payroll tax is [believed to be] largely passed on to employees in the form of 
lower wages”); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Comment, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 696-97 (2002) (citing Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith, MODERN LABOR 
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 84-87 (6th ed. 1997)) (explaining how employees bear burden of payroll 
tax through lower wages and lower employment levels); McCaffery, supra note 34, at 1875-76 (1994) (describing 
social security contributions by employer as type of hidden tax because employer’s contribution comes at cost of 
lower pay for employee). 
38
 See, e.g., TAXING OURSELVES, supra note 29, at 75 (explaining that employers will adjust salary they are 
willing to pay to account for taxes imposed on them); McCaffery, supra note 34, at 1878-79 (explaining that it does 
not matter whether employer or employee is target of social security tax because, ultimately, employee only gets 
money left after taxes are paid).   
39
 TAXING OURSELVES, supra note 29, at 76. 
40
 Trustees of Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514, 562 
(1830) (“The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a 
collective and changing body of men.”). 
41
 See, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH, WHO BEARS THE CORPORATE TAX? A REVIEW OF WHAT WE KNOW 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005) (noting “cardinal rule of incidence analysis that only 
individuals can bear the burden of taxation and that all tax burdens should be traced to individuals”); Andrew B. 
Lyon, CRACKING THE CODE: MAKING SENSE OF THE CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 49 (1997) (“Clearly 
only people can ultimately bear the burden of the corporate tax through their roles as savers and investors, workers, 
and consumers.”);  Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1101 (2000) (“Aggregate views of the corporation began to emerge as economic and legal commentators noted that 
corporate entities do not bear the economic burden of the corporate tax because only natural persons can bear 
economic burdens.”); TAXING OURSELVES, supra note 29, at 78-79 (discussing how corporation’s stockholders, 
employees, or customers bear burden of corporate taxes). 
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III.  THE TAXATION OF COMPENSATION 
 
Executive compensation packages have evolved in an ad hoc manner over the course of 
the last century in response to changing market forces, firm structure, public opinion, and 
governmental regulation.42  Presently, the label “executive compensation” encompasses a wide 
variety of arrangements that are, in theory, carefully crafted by each company to recruit and 
retain the best executive talent available, and then to align executive interests with shareholder 
interests.43  These are not the only considerations; tax law, corporate law, securities law, and 
accounting principles all play a role in the design of an executive compensation package.   
 
Tax law, however, did not play a directly regulating role prior to the mid-1980s.44  Before 
then, the federal government regulated executive compensation largely through media outside of 
the Code.45  This does not mean that the Code did not apply to executives or their employers, and 
thus did not have any affect on an executive’s after-tax compensation (i.e., the final amount the 
executive has available to spend, save, or invest after taxes are paid).  On the contrary, it applied, 
but in the same way it applied to all taxpayers.46  In other words, the Code’s influence was 
limited to the rules governing the taxation of all compensation, executive or otherwise; it did not 
alter the generally applicable rules in order to tax executive compensation differently solely 
because it was compensation paid to executives.47  
 
                                                 
42
 See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or For the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. 
L. 231, 245 (1983) (discussing factors that have shaped modern executive compensation packages); see also Marlo 
A. Bakris, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC’s Newest Weapon in its Arsenal Against Executive 
Compensation Abuses, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 105, 114 (1993) (listing tax laws, government regulations, and 
“economic changes” as factors in evolution of executive compensation). 
43
 For further discussion of the factors involved in setting an executive’s compensation, see generally LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).  See also supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
44
 A question that might be raised at this point is whether the 1980s is an appropriate reference date inasmuch 
as section 162(a)(1), which imposes a reasonableness limit on compensation deductions, was enacted before the 
1980s.  Note 90, infra, explains why this article treats section 162(a)(1) differently than the other Code provisions 
discussed herein. 
45
 Up until the 1980s, these efforts fell into two broad categories: mandated disclosures and salary limits at 
companies doing business with the government.  Discussion of these efforts is beyond the scope of this article, but 
see generally MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939 at 74-
90 (Cambridge University Press 1984) (discussing New Deal attempts to curtail executive compensation levels).  
Some view the sharp increase in marginal tax rates during the 1930s as an attempt to use the Code to regulate 
executive compensation.  See Elson, supra note 8, at 938-939 (noting response to executive compensation levels in 
1930s was to raise income tax rates on high-income taxpayers and that executive compensation issue was thereafter 
dormant until 1980s).  While this is not exactly untrue, such action was also not limited to affecting executives but 
applied to all high income taxpayers.    
46
 Code section 7701(a)(14) defines the term taxpayer as “any person subject to any internal revenue tax,” 
and Code section 7701(a)(1), in turn, defines the term person to include “an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, 
association, company or corporation.”  Thus, here, the term taxpayer is used to refer to both the executive and his 
employer.  The Code applies to both executives and their employers, and through them, executive compensation 
levels or after-tax executive compensation levels are affected. 
47
 Nevertheless, some executives received compensation in forms not generally payable to rank-and-file 
employees and such compensation, in that way, may have been subject to non-punitive tax provisions not generally 
applied to rank-and-file employees.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 83 (applying to transfers of property for services, such as 
restricted stock).  
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Starting in 1984, however, and then every decade thereafter, Congress has enacted a tax 
penalty provision aimed at shaping executive compensation.48  Two of the provisions, discussed 
in subsection B, impose a penalty on the company paying the compensation (sections 280G and 
162(m)), while two others impose a penalty on the executive receiving the compensation 
(sections 4999 and 409A).  Each provision alters what would otherwise be the normal operating 
tax rules in order to penalize the targeted taxpayer conduct.49  Thus, before the functionality of 
the tax penalties can be examined, it is useful to discuss those baseline rules.50 
 
A.  An Overview 
 
In a compensation transaction, the tax consequences must be determined for both parties 
to the transaction: the employer (or payor) and the employee (or payee).  The rules applicable to 
each are discussed in turn briefly below.  It is assumed, for purposes of this subsection, that the 
compensation paid to an employee is not subject to any of the tax penalties that are discussed in 
subsection B. 
  
1.  Employees 
 
In computing federal income tax liability, each individual employee must include in gross 
income the amount he or she receives as compensation for performing services.51  A wide variety 
of employee benefits are, however, excluded from gross income (i.e., are not subject to federal 
income tax), such as payments an employer makes to provide the employee with health 
insurance or qualified discounts the employer provides on the purchase of its products.52  With 
regard to compensation that is not excludable, the critical question is one of timing: when must 
such compensation be included in gross income.53   
 
                                                 
48
 It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze why the Code was used to regulate executive compensation 
in this way.  Professor Edward Zelinsky suggests it is easier to enact regulating legislation as tax legislation because 
it avoids other substantive committees in Congress, has become a yearly affair, and is usually cumbersome and 
technical, so it is relatively easier to get legislation enacted that might not otherwise pass muster.  See supra note 20 
(commenting, too, that approach is bad because it avoids consideration of the real issues, increases administrative 
costs, and grants regulatory authority to those lacking expertise in area). 
49
 See supra note 13 (defining the phrase “normal operating tax rules” for purposes of this article).  
50
 This article discusses the tax consequences of both current and deferred compensation.  It does not address, 
however, certain types of compensation found within both categories, such as fringe benefits, stock-based 
compensation, and life insurance arrangements (split-dollar or corporate-owned).  Accordingly, the current 
compensation discussion is largely limited to base salary, and the discussion of deferred compensation is essentially 
limited to the deferral of cash to a qualified plan and the deferral of cash or a promise to pay outside of a qualified 
plan. 
51
 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).  See also Treas. Reg. §1.61-1(a) (“[G]ross income includes income in any form, whether 
in money, property, or services.”) and Treas. Reg. §1.162-2(d) (compensation paid other than in cash). 
52
 See I.R.C. § 106 (employer contributions to an accident and health plan) and §132(a)(2) & (c) (qualified 
employee discount).  See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (listing Code provisions specifically excluding items from 
gross income and also provisions specifically including items in gross income). 
53
 Under time value of money principles, it is generally more advantageous for a taxpayer to defer the 
inclusion of income to a later taxable period, but claim deductions in the earliest allowable year.  See generally 
William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type Or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1123-24 
(1974);  Gregory M. Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure For The Controversy Over The Amortization 
Of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 737 (1995). 
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The answer depends on the method of accounting that the taxpayer uses.54  Individuals 
typically use the “cash receipts and disbursements” method of accounting.55  Under that method, 
individual taxpayers generally include an item in income for the taxable year it is received.56  
Thus, wages and other taxable employee benefits that are received as they are earned are 
currently includable.  
 
Receipt under the cash method, however, is not limited to actual receipt; it includes items 
that are constructively received as well.57  Constructive receipt occurs when compensation has 
been made available to the taxpayer without substantial limitations or restrictions, but the 
taxpayer chooses to defer actual receipt to a later point in time.58  In that situation, the taxpayer 
must include it in income, even though he does not have physical possession of it, because he 
had control over receipt of the deferred payment and thus received it constructively.59   
 
By way of an example, assume Paula is a small business owner who regularly uses a 
particular repairman, Tom, as needs for his services arise.  Both taxpayers use the cash method 
of accounting.  Assume further that Tom does some work for Paula in December of Year 1.  If 
Paula offers to write Tom a check at that time to compensate him for services rendered, and he 
requests instead that she hold off paying him until January of Year 2, then Tom has 
constructively received payment in December of Year 1.  As such, he is subject to tax on that 
payment in Year 1, not Year 2 when it is actually received.  In this situation, Tom is attempting 
to postpone the receipt of compensation in order to defer paying taxes on it.  There are several 
reasons a taxpayer might want to do this.  One would be that he expects his income will be 
subject to tax at a lower rate in a later year.  Another could be that he wants to take advantage of 
time value of money principles by deferring inclusion of income.60  The constructive receipt 
doctrine acts as an impediment to these types of tax planning. 
 
Congress, however, looks favorably upon some deferred compensation arrangements.  To 
help Americans save for retirement, it has expressly authorized a deferral of income tax on 
                                                 
54
 See James E. Maule, Deductions: Overview and Conceptual Aspects, 503 TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIOS (BNA) 
A46 (2008).  For further discussion of tax accounting methods, see generally George L. White, Accounting Methods 
-- General Principles, 570 TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIOS (BNA) (2008) (discussing permissible methods of accounting).   
See also I.R.C.§ 446 et seq. (Methods of Accounting).  
55
 See I.R.C. §446(c)(1) [hereinafter, the “cash method”].     
56
 See I.R.C. § 451(a). 
57
 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), 1.451-1(a), and 1.451-2.  
58
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (“Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s possession is 
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or 
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the 
taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the 
taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.”).  There are, of course, certain 
situations in which a taxpayer may refuse receipt of income without triggering tax consequences, such as refusing to 
receive a prize.  See, e.g., Revenue Ruling 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69 (“Where an individual refuses to accept an all-
expense paid vacation trip he won as a prize in a contest, the fair market value of the trip is not includible in his 
gross income.”). 
59
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a);  but see Comm’r v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1942) (concluding 
unqualified refusal to accept further compensation for calendar year, with mere suggestion for its disposition, 
resulted in no income to taxpayer). 
60
 See supra note 53. 
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compensation deferred under a “qualified plan,” such as a 401(k) retirement savings plan.61  
These plans are so named because they must meet certain qualification requirements to receive 
the favorable tax treatment.62  The qualification requirements are designed, in part, to ensure that 
employers who sponsor a qualified plan for their employees do so in a broad-based manner.63   
 
If the qualification requirements are met, employees receive two principal tax benefits.64  
First, contributions to the plan are not included in the employees’ income until received by the 
employee at some later date.65  Second, investment earnings on the contributions accumulate tax-
free and are not subject to tax until later distributed to the employee.66 
 
There are limits, however, to the amount of compensation that can be deferred under a 
qualified plan.67  Thus, many employers seeking to provide greater incentives68 to their 
executives frequently choose to provide “nonqualified” deferred compensation benefits, which 
are not subject to a dollar denominated limitation, in addition to qualified benefits.69  
                                                 
61
 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 401(k), and 501(a).  Although there are a number of specific types of qualified plans, 
there are two broad general categories: defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans.  Under § 414(i), a 
“defined contribution plan” is “a plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits 
based solely on the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and 
any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”  A defined 
benefit plan is defined under the Code as any plan that is not a defined contribution plan.  I.R.C. § 414(j).  
Generally, a defined benefit plan promises the participant a specific sum (whether stated or based on a formula) at 
retirement.  For more on the differences between defined contribution and defined benefit plans, see generally 
Zelinsky, supra note 15 (discussing fundamental differences between defined contribution and defined benefit 
plans).  The discussion in this article is generally limited to defined contribution-type arrangements, whether 
qualified or nonqualified, for the reasons discussed in note 252, infra. 
62
 See I.R.C. § 401(a).  In addition, qualified plans are also governed by the rules of the Employees 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), which impose, for example, various reporting and disclosure 
obligations on employers. 
63
 In other words, the plan must cover rank-and-file employees in addition to executives, and benefits must 
be provided under the plan in a nondiscriminatory fashion.  See I.R.C. §§ 401(a) & (m) (nondiscrimination) and 410 
(coverage and nondiscrimination).  Other qualification requirements include rules regarding funding and vesting.  
See I.R.C. §§ 401(a) (funding), 411 (vesting), and 412 (funding). 
64
 Qualified plans also provide participants with a significant non-tax benefit.   Assets of a qualified plan are 
required to be held in a trust that cannot be reached by the employer’s creditors and “for the exclusive benefit of  . . . 
employees or their beneficiaries.”  I.R.C. § 401(a). 
65
 See I.R.C. § 402(a) (taxable when distributed according to section 72).  Notwithstanding the foregoing, as 
of 2006, employers who sponsor certain retirement plans (such as a 401(k) plan) have the option of incorporating a 
Roth contribution program into their plans.  See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16 § 617(a) (enacting Code § 402A); Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
280 (2006) (making §402A permanent); I.R.C. § 402A .  A Roth contribution program allows employees to elect to 
make all or a portion of their plan contributions on an after-tax basis, with investment earnings and withdrawals 
being tax-free.  See id. 
66
 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), and 501(a). 
67
 See I.R.C. § 415 (providing an annual aggregate limit on contributions of $46,000 for defined contribution 
plans in 2008). 
68
 See, e.g., Michael Doran, Executive Compensation Reform And The Limits Of Tax Policy, 2004 Tax 
Notes Today (Dec. 29, 2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 250-21 (discussing various rationales for deferred compensation 
packages). 
69
 Prior to 2004, the Code did not provide a definition of the phrase “nonqualified deferred compensation 
plan.”  Now, Code section 409A provides for purposes of that section, the phrase “nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan” means “any plan that provides for the deferral of compensation, other than a qualified employer 
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Nonqualified plans make no attempt to meet the Code’s qualified plan requirements.70  
Accordingly, Congress’s grant of income tax deferral for amounts deferred under a qualified plan 
does not extend to compensation deferred under a nonqualified plan.   
 
To sidestep current income taxation, taxpayers deferring compensation under a 
nonqualified plan must avoid application of the constructive receipt doctrine.71  They must also 
avoid application of related doctrines that have been developed by the courts, Congress, and the 
IRS to deal with similar situations.72  As a practical matter, it is fairly easy to design a 
nonqualified plan that avoids these rules and thus sidesteps current inclusion of deferred 
compensation in the employee’s gross income.  Such arrangements are generally, but not always, 
“unfunded.”73  For tax purposes, unfunded means that amounts have not been set aside by the 
employer for the exclusive benefit of the employee.  In other words, the deferred compensation 
at a minimum remains subject to the claims of the employer’s creditors, even if the deferred 
compensation is segregated from the employer’s general assets or held in a trust.74  Additionally, 
funded arrangements may avoid current inclusion in gross income if the deferred compensation 
                                                                                                                                                             
plan, and any bona fide vacation leave, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay, or death benefit plan.”  I.R.C. 
§ 409A(d)(1).  Section 409A is discussed further infra Part III.B.3. 
70
 In addition, most nonqualified plans are relieved from the vast majority of ERISA’s requirements. See 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(5), 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), and 1101(a)(1).  See also supra note 62. 
71
 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing constructive receipt of income). 
72
 For example, a similar situation exists where the employee receives a promise by the employer to pay 
compensation in the future.  Receipt of a mere promise to be paid in the future is not generally income to a cash 
method taxpayer.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42 (“Certain evidences of indebtedness are property 
deemed to be equivalent to cash, but not all evidences of indebtedness are property the fair market value of which is 
includible in the income of a taxpayer on the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting.”).  It may, 
nevertheless, have value.  If the employee can realize its value by selling it for cash – in other words, if the promise 
is transferable – then the promise to pay is a “cash equivalent” and its receipt is taxable.  See id. (applying cash 
equivalency doctrine).  See also Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 23-25 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing cash 
equivalency doctrine).  If the promise is not transferable, but its value can be determined and the employee’s right to 
payment is vested, secured, or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then it may also be subject to tax on 
receipt.  See, e.g., Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, aff’d 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952) (applying economic 
benefit doctrine); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 Ex. 4. (same); I.R.C. § 83 (codifying the economic benefit 
doctrine where property is transferred as compensation for services); §402(b) (applicable to employer contributions 
to a taxable trust).  This is because the employee has received the “economic benefit” of the promise to pay.  See id.  
See also generally, Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer On The Taxation Of Executive Deferred Compensation Plans, 35 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487 (Summer 2002)  (discussing each of the cited provisions and doctrines).   
In 2004, Congress enacted Code section 409A, a provision that several commentators view as a supplement 
to the constructive receipt and economic benefit doctrines.  See infra note 194.  Where applicable, section 409A 
prescribes a number of specific requirements and also imposes a penalty for failure to meet those requirements.  As 
to the latter, section 409A is one of the tax penalties within the scope of this article and is discussed infra Part 
III.B.3.  For more on the new requirements of section 409A, see generally David G. Johnson & Elizabeth 
Buchbinder, Long-Awaited Final Regulations Under Code Sec. 409A Are Issued As Transition Relief Nears an End, 
TAXES--THE TAX MAGAZINE, at 29-35 (Sept. 2007) (discussing basic requirements of 409A). 
73
 Only a select group of management or highly compensated employees may participate in an unfunded 
nonqualified plan.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), and 1101(a)(1). 
74
 Such an arrangement generally avoids current taxation under the constructive receipt doctrine of section 
451. 
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is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and is nontransferable.75  In either case, the employee 
bears some measure of risk that he or she may not receive the deferred compensation.76 
 
In summary, compensation that is paid to an employee as it is earned is currently 
includable in gross income.  Compensation the employee defers receipt of to some point in the 
future well beyond the period when earned may or may not be currently includable.  If the 
compensation is deferred pursuant to a qualified plan, then income tax is also deferred until the 
compensation is later received by the employee.  If the compensation is otherwise deferred (i.e., 
nonqualified), then either (1) the employee bears some measure of risk of loss of the deferred 
compensation and thus it is not subject to current inclusion in gross income, or (2) the employee 
bears no significant risk of loss of the deferred compensation and thus it is subject to current 
inclusion in gross income.  
 
Whenever compensation is ultimately included in income, it will be taxed at ordinary 
income rates.77  Congress, however, enacted legislation imposing a penalty tax, in addition to the 
ordinary income taxes otherwise normally due, on certain components of the typical executive 
compensation package.  In 1984, Congress enacted section 4999, which is applicable to 
payments made pursuant to a “golden parachute” agreement.78  Ten years later, Congress enacted 
section 409A, which is applicable to nonqualified deferred compensation.79  Both of these 
provisions are discussed in subsection B. 
 
                                                 
75
 Such an arrangement generally avoids current taxation under section 83. 
76
 Again, as a practical matter, these arrangements can usually be designed so as to provide a significant 
amount of security to the employee.  Today, the vehicle of choice is usually a “rabbi trust,” which is essentially an 
irrevocable grantor trust.  See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8113107 (Dec. 31, 1980) (approving first rabbi trust agreement); Rev. 
Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (providing model rabbi trust agreement).  Although security is provided in that the 
trust is irrevocable by the employer, it still can be reached by the employer’s creditors, especially in light of new 
restrictions imposed by section 409A which limit offshore rabbi trusts and prohibit provisions that would trigger full 
funding of the deferred compensation upon certain events linked to the employer’s financial condition.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 409A(b)(1) & (2). 
77
 See generally I.R.C. §§ 1 (tax imposed) and 55 (alternative minimum tax).  Of course this is after 
application of any available deductions or credits.  See generally I.R.C. §§ 63 (taxable income defined), & 21-54 
(“Credits Against Tax”).  Compensation may also be subject to other taxes such as state income taxes or payroll 
taxes. 
78
 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) [hereinafter DEFRA].  Note that section 
4999 can apply to highly compensated employees of non publicly held companies, but its application is limited.  See 
infra note 116. 
79
 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) [hereinafter AJCA].  
Note that section 409A’s application is broader than the executive class.  See I.R.C. §§ 409A(d)(1) &(3) (defining 
nonqualified deferred compensation plan); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(f) (defining service provider for purposes of 
section 409A). Subject to exceptions, it applies to anyone receiving nonqualified deferred compensation, within the 
meaning of the statute, in exchange for providing services, which is one of the criticisms levied against the 
provision.  See id.  See also Drennan, supra note 6, at 3-4 (“409A applies to all employers and employees, rather 
than just the top executives at publicly held corporations!”); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(14) (providing relief from 
the application of section 409A in certain cases where service providers, such as teachers, engage in the common 
practice of receiving nine or ten months of compensation over a 12-month period). Nevertheless, the impetus for 
enactment was certain executive compensation practices that came to light in the aftermath of the collapse of Enron.  
See infra Part III.B.3. In that way, it was aimed mainly at executives even though it could affect some non-
executives as well. 
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2.  Employers 
 
Section 162 allows the company a deduction for the compensation it pays to its 
employees.80  More specifically, section 162(a) allows companies to deduct from their income all 
the “ordinary and necessary” business expenses they paid or incurred during the taxable year, 
including any compensation paid to employees.81  The employee compensation deduction is, 
however, limited by section 162(a)(1) to a “reasonable allowance” “for personal services actually 
rendered.”82  The regulations under section 162 reiterate that “the test of deductibility in the case 
of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for 
                                                 
80
 “Generally, no item is allowable as a deduction unless a statutory provision so provides.”  Maule, supra 
note 54 at A1.  See also I.R.C. §§ 63(a) & (b).  Further, the courts view deductions as a matter of “legislative grace,” 
and thus “the burden of clearly showing the right to [a] claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.”  INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (citation omitted).  Even where a provision exists, such as section 162, allowing a 
deduction, “a variety of limitations and restrictions cause otherwise deductible amounts to be nondeductible.” 
Maule, infra at A1.  The following is a non-exhaustive list of Code provisions that could apply to limit, restrict, 
deny, or affect the timing of a compensation deduction:  § 83(h) (transfers of restricted property); § 162(a)(1) 
(reasonableness, discussed infra), § 263 (capital expenditures), § 267(a)(2) (payments to a “related” taxpayer), § 404 
(deferred compensation, discussed infra), § 421(a)(2) (incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plans).  
Also, compensation payments made in violation of public policy are not deductible.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(c) 
(disallowing business expense deduction for illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other payments); Anne E. Moran, 
Reasonable Compensation, 390 TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIOS (BNA) A27-A28 (2007) (explaining how compensation 
payments “that are both reasonable in amount and made for services” are not deductible when in violation of public 
policy, and listing payments to labor racketeers, bribes and expenses connected to illegal sales of drugs as 
examples). 
81
 Note that section 404 disallows an employer’s deduction for deferred compensation that is otherwise 
allowable under section 162 unless the deferred compensation meets the requirements of section 404 as well.  See 
I.R.C. § 404(a).  An employer can thus only deduct deferred compensation that satisfies the requirements of both 
sections 162 and  404. 
82
 The reasonable compensation rule applies to current and deferred compensation in the aggregate.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(b) (“In no case is a deduction allowable under section 404(a) [for deferred compensation] 
for the amount of any contribution for the benefit of an employee in excess of the amount which, together with other 
deductions allowed for compensation for such employee’s services, constitutes a reasonable allowance for 
compensation for the services actually rendered.”);  Edwin’s, Inc. v. U.S., 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
pension payments must be considered when determining whether total compensation is reasonable).  
There is disagreement over the original purpose for enactment of the statutory predecessor to section 
162(a)(1) in the Revenue Act of 1918.  Some commentators believe it was enacted to expand the scope of section 
162(a) to allow a deduction in certain situations where no (or little) compensation was paid for services rendered and 
“that there is no foundation in the statute for its use as a means of restricting the deduction of amounts which had 
actually been paid.”  See Erwin Griswold, New Light on “A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries,” 59 HARV. L. REV. 
286, 290 (1945); Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION ¶ 6.1, at 
6-2 (2004) [hereinafter Bittker & Lokken] (suggesting provision may have been added “to permit closely held 
enterprises to deduct an allowance for excess profits tax even if no salary was actually paid”).   Others appear to be 
of the opinion that it was enacted to codify existing regulatory provisions discussing the nature of deductible 
compensation (the substance of which remain substantially the same today), and was not meant to allow deductions 
where no compensation had been paid.  See Moran, supra note 80 at A1-A2.  All agree, however, on the following 
two points related to IRS regulations and practice prior to enactment: (1) companies in the relevant circumstances 
were allowed to deduct as compensation an amount that had not been paid, and (2) a deduction could be denied for 
amounts actually paid if in substance the payment was not compensation for services but an otherwise nondeductible 
distribution such as a dividend. See id.; Bittker & Lokken, supra, ¶ 6.1 at 6-2.   
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services.”83  Whether this test has been met is a fact-specific inquiry dependent on a variety of 
factors.84 
                                                 
83
 Treas. Reg § 1.162-7(a).  It thus appears that section 162(a)(1) and the regulations thereunder provide a 
two-part test for determining the deductibility of compensation: it must be both reasonable and paid purely for 
services.  There appears, however, to be some disagreement over the interaction and relative importance of each 
prong of the two-part test.  Several commentators have noted that the courts tend to focus primarily on the first 
prong: determining whether the amount of compensation is reasonable.  See Stabile, supra note 11 at 85 (“Although 
the Regulations seem on their face to envision a two-part test, in reality, the primary inquiry is whether the amount 
of compensation in question is reasonable, since courts will infer from that conclusion the existence of a 
compensatory purpose.”);  Moran, supra note 80 at A3 (“The courts rarely invoke the intent test. Rather, the courts 
typically analyze reasonable compensation issues under the amount test . . . This is because compensatory intent 
often is inferred upon a determination that the compensation at issue is reasonable.”).  Meanwhile, others view the 
two prongs as inextricably linked and therefore one cannot be considered without considering aspects of the other.  
See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 82, ¶ 6.1 at 6-3 (“In principle, whether an amount is paid for services and whether 
it is reasonable in amount are separate issues, but in practice it is virtually impossible to analyze them separately.”).    
In the end, however, it would seem that there is in substance less disagreement among commentators than 
initially appears to be the case.  See Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 VA. TAX REV. 
371, 379 (1999).  Even though many perceive the amount test to be of primary importance, all agree that the IRS 
rarely pursues litigation unless the IRS suspects the payments are not “purely for services” but “camouflage” an 
otherwise nondeductible distribution such as dividends.  See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 82, ¶ 6.1 at 6-3; Stumpff, 
supra at 380 (discussing use of section 162 to reveal non-compensatory payments disguised to be compensatory); 
Barbara F. Sikon, Note, The Recharacterization of Unreasonable Compensation: An Equitale Mandate, 51 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004) (“The deduction limitation of section 162 has been applied historically in a manner that 
illuminates a singular purpose, that is, to unveil payments of a non-compensatory nature that have been disguised as 
compensation to create a tax benefit.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Reasonable Compensation: A Study in Doctrinal 
Obsolescence, 58th NYU Inst. 11 (2001) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=254928; 
Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 392 (2008) (“[Courts] have applied the standard primarily to limit payments by closely held 
companies where those companies have tried to disguise nondeductible dividends as compensation which would be 
deductible.”).  In other words, the second prong is what motivates the IRS.  See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra (“Thus, in the 
final analysis, the reasonable compensation doctrine is today an anomaly, in practice a narrowly focused effort to 
extract a second, entity level tax on the income from those closely-held corporations unable to shift to the now 
dominant, one-tax regime for closely-held business income.”).  This may be obscured, however, because the courts 
in reasonable compensation cases claim to be assessing the amount prong.  See Stumpff, supra at 400 (“If courts 
were more willing to accept that the true object of inquiry for the deduction question is the character of a payment 
rather than its amount, they could acknowledge that in certain cases”).  In reality, the factors the courts assess to 
determine whether an amount is reasonable appear to be a proxy for determining whether the amount is really 
compensation for services or something else entirely.  See id. at 401 (noting contrast in rule as applied and as 
stated); Sikon, supra.  See also infra note 84 (discussing reasonable compensation). 
84
 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (“In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not 
exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances.  It is, in general, just to assume that reasonable and true 
compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like 
circumstances.”).  The courts generally use one of two approaches to determine whether compensation paid was 
reasonable under all the circumstances.  Some courts consider a variety of factors, such as the employee’s 
qualifications and the employee’s compensation in comparison to similar employees in similar companies.  See, e.g., 
Mayson Mfg. Co. v. CIR, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) (setting forth a number of commonly considered 
factors).  This is referred to as the “multi-factor” approach.  Other courts will view the relevant facts through the 
lens of a hypothetical independent investor to assess whether such an investor, who would presumably be concerned 
with the rate of return on his investment, would have been amenable to the amount of compensation paid.  See, e.g., 
Elliotts, Inc. v. CIR, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983) (independent investor test); Dexsil Corp. v. CIR, 147 F.3d 
96, 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998); Exacto Spring Corp. v. CIR, 196 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 1999) (criticizing multifactor 
approach).   This is referred to as the “independent investor” approach.  For more on the reasonable compensation 
rule, see generally Moran, supra note 80.  Note that the IRS will not rule on whether compensation is reasonable in 
amount.  See Rev. Proc. 2008-3, 2008-1 IRB 110, § 3.01(20). 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, section 162(a)(1)’s reasonableness clause has rarely been 
used to challenge the amount of compensation paid to an employee in an arms length business 
relationship.85 Instead, it has been used to police compensation levels where the employer and 
employee have a suspect relationship, such as where the employee is also a significant 
stakeholder in the business or a relative of a significant stakeholder.86  In those situations, the 
concern is that the company is “artificially increasing employee compensation in an attempt to 
disburse profits in a deductible form, as opposed to a nondeductible form such as gifts or 
dividends.”87  This is most likely to occur in the context of a closely held business.88  
Conversely, compensation paid by a publicly held corporation is typically viewed as inherently 
reasonable.89  Stated differently, the reasonableness clause has not been employed to limit the 
deductibility of compensation paid in the ordinary course to public company executives.90   
                                                 
85
 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (“Any form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny as a possible 
distribution of earnings of the enterprise . . . [but] if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a free bargain . . . it 
should be allowed as a deduction even though . . . it may prove to be greater than the amount which would ordinarily 
be provided.”); Bittker & Lokken, supra note 82, ¶ 6.1 at 6-2 to 6-4 (“If there is no extraneous relationship between 
employer and employee, the amount fixed by them as payment for the services is almost always ipso facto 
reasonable, since they meet the willing-buyer, willing-seller criterion used in determining the fair market value of 
goods and services.”); Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 494 (2005) (noting that courts have been unwilling to scrutinize compensation plans); Moran, 
supra note 80 at A12 (“There does not appear to be any case which holds that compensation paid in a truly arm’s 
length situation was not intended as compensation.”); Stumpff, supra note 83 at 373-74 (explaining how employers 
do not feel constrained by section 162(a) because it is rarely enforced); Zelinsky, supra note 83 (“While payments to 
managers of publicly-traded corporations have reached truly Olympian heights, the IRS has yet to challenge the 
reasonability, and thus the deductibility, of those payments.”).  
86
 See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 82, ¶ 6.1 at 6-3; Sikon, supra note 81 at 308 (“Challenges through 
section 162(a) have been reserved for closely held businesses, in which the owner can determine both the amounts 
and the characterizations of payments to employees.”); Stabile supra note 11  at 96-97 (noting that reasonable 
compensation cases arise mostly with closely-held businesses).  
87
 Miske, supra note 20, at 1676.  See also supra note 83 (discussing two prong test for determining if 
compensation is reasonable). 
88
 See, e.g., Treas. Reg § 1.162-7(b)(1) (“Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the 
purchase price of services, is not deductible. An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of a 
dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of 
whom draw salaries.”); Moran, supra note 80 at A3; Bittker & Lokken, supra note 82, ¶ 6.1 at 6-3.  See also supra 
note 83; Graef S. Crystal, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 89 (1991) 
(explaining that IRS targets businesses with small numbers of executives who own most or all shares of company 
and are capable of self-dealing); Stabile, supra note 11,  at 85 (“IRS efforts to disallow deductions for compensation 
have generally been targeted at close corporations, where the executive is essentially setting her own salary and the 
allegation is that the amounts paid are unreasonable or are really disguised dividends and not compensation.”); 
Vagts, supra note 42, at 257. 
89
 See Moran, supra note 80, at A13 (“This suggests that any amount of compensation paid by a publicly held 
corporation should be per se reasonable. In this situation, the operation of the normal system of commercial checks 
and balances arguably is adequate to ensure a proper result so that review by the IRS generally is unnecessary.”). 
90
 On the rare occasions the IRS has attempted to pursue public companies, it has been unsuccessful.  See, 
e.g., Sikon, supra note 81, at 308 (“Although large corporations can make excessive salary payments, they are not 
attacked through section 162(a) because the character of the payments as compensation is not subject to dispute.”); 
Stabile supra note 11  at 85 (“There are few cases, none of them recent . . ., in which the IRS has challenged 
compensation paid to executives of publicly-held companies.”). 
This article does not view section 162(a)(1) as a tax penalty within its ambit (regulating executive 
compensation) because the reasonable compensation rule (1) is not generally applied to publicly held companies, 
which are the focus of this article, and (2) is not used to challenge compensation for being too great in amount, it is 
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In any event, as above with regard to employee inclusion, determining when a company 
may deduct compensation is important.  In contrast to individuals, corporations typically use the 
“accrual” method of accounting.91  Under that method, expenses are deductible when “all the 
events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be 
determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with respect to 
the liability.”92  Accordingly, compensation that is required to be paid as the employee earns it, is 
deductible when so paid.  That is when the employer’s obligation to pay becomes fixed and 
determinable, and also when economic performance occurs.93   
 
Deferred compensation, however, is generally subject to matching rules.  These rules 
provide that the employer receives a deduction when the employee includes such compensation 
in income.94  The result is that employers are effectively put on the equivalent of the cash method 
of accounting for purposes of deducting deferred compensation.95  Thus, nonqualified deferred 
compensation is not deductible until included in the employee’s income.96  On the other hand, 
compensation deferred under a qualified plan is specifically excepted from application of the 
matching rules and employers are allowed a current deduction even though the employee has no 
inclusion, subject to limits.97 
 
Setting aside time value of money considerations, the compensation deduction operates to 
effectively reduce the employer’s cost of compensation by an amount equal to the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
used to challenge amounts that allegedly are not compensation at all.  In the latter case, the denial of a compensation 
deduction is not a penalty because the payment would not have been deductible in the first place if characterized 
according to its substance. 
Most commentators agree that the statutory language of 162(a)(1) would support challenges of executive 
compensation levels, even in public companies.  See Stabile, supra note 11,  at 85 (“Section 162(a)(1) appears to 
operate as a restriction on the amounts that may be paid to executives. The language of the statute and the 
regulations certainly gives the IRS the authority to disallow deductions for compensation that is viewed to be 
unreasonable.”); Sikon, supra note 81, at 308 (explaining that large, public companies could be challenged but 
usually are not because there are typically no issues with character of payments); Stumpff, supra note 83 at 387 
(stating that courts have expressly insisted that public corporations are subject to rule);  Zelinsky, supra note 83 at 
10 (“Nothing in the statute limits the test of reasonability to closely-held corporations or otherwise supports the 
IRS’s de facto interpretation of Section 162(a)(1) as constraining only closely-held corporations.”).  Assuming, 
however, that the IRS would want to regularly undertake such challenges, there are a variety of obstacles the IRS 
would face, such as the business judgment rule and possibly section 162(m) itself.  See generally Kenneth C. 
Johnson, Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 
YALE L.J. 909 (1985) (discussing effect of business judgment rule on IRS regulation); Stabile, supra note 11, at 96-7 
(“To the extent [section 162(m) is viewed as defining reasonableness at the $ 1 million level, the addition of that 
section of the Code may make it difficult for courts to challenge compensation that is less than $ 1 million.”). 
91
 See § I.R.C. 446(c)(2). 
92
 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii).  See also I.R.C. § 461(h) (economic performance); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
1(a)(2).  The accrual method thus focuses on when an expense becomes a fixed and determinable obligation as 
opposed to the cash method’s focus on payment. 
93
 Section 461(h)(2)(A)(i) provides that in this situation economic performance occurs as a person provides 
services. 
94
 See I.R.C. §§ 404(a)(5), (b) and (d), 83(h), and 267(a)(2). 
95
 See supra Part III.A.1 (describing cash method of accounting). 
96
 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). 
97
 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)-(4). 
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marginal tax rate multiplied by the amount of the deductible payment.98  In a simplified example, 
assume a corporation pays an employee $1 million and pays tax at a flat rate of 40 percent.  
Further assume that the corporation has taxable income of $2 million after application of all 
deductions other than the $1 million payment.  If the corporation could not deduct the $1 million 
payment, it would owe $800,000 in taxes ($2 million x .40).99  Allowing the corporation to 
deduct the compensation reduces its tax liability to $400,000 (($2 million -$1 million) x .40).  
Thus, the section 162(a) deduction reduces to $600,000 the cost of paying the employee $1 
million.  It also comports with the income tax system’s policy of generally taxing net as opposed 
to gross business income.100  
 
But, for reasons discussed below, Congress enacted tax provisions that in effect presume 
certain levels and types of executive compensation are unreasonable and therefore not 
deductible.101  In 1984, Congress enacted section 280G, which applies to golden parachute 
payments.102  And in 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m), which applies to compensation 
more generally.103  
 
B.  Tax Penalty Provisions Aimed At Shaping Executive Compensation 
 
Congress has become enamored with enacting tax penalties purportedly to discourage 
executive compensation practices that are, in its view, undesirable. These penalties come in two 
forms: a denial of a deduction to the employer for compensation it pays or the imposition of 
additional taxes on the compensation an executive receives.  Many companies and their 
executives, however, do not view these penalties as a significant impediment to crafting desired 
executive compensation packages.  Some maneuver around the penalties, and others willingly 
choose to incur them.  
 
The following table indicates the provisions that are discussed in this subsection, in 
chronological order, identifying when they were enacted and on whom the penalty was imposed: 
 
                                                 
98
 A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is the rate applied to the last taxable dollar. 
99
 This assumes there are no applicable credits, and no estimated taxes have been paid. 
100
  Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon & Lawrence Zelenak, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
¶11.01[1] at 11-4 (2002). 
101
 Under these provisions, nondeductible compensation is still treated as compensation to the recipient for 
tax purposes.  See Sikon, supra note 81, at 303 (discussing how unreasonable payments are both non-deductible and 
taxable).  This is in contrast to amounts determined to be nondeductible under section 162(a)(1) because the 
payment was not compensation for services but an otherwise nondeductible distribution.  In that case, in the hands 
of the employee the characterization of amounts received for tax purposes will depend on the circumstances and the 
substance of the payments.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (“The income tax liability of the recipient in respect of an 
amount ostensibly paid to him as compensation, but not allowed to be deducted as such by the payor, will depend 
upon the circumstances of each case. Thus, in the case of excessive payments by corporations, if such payments 
correspond or bear a close relationship to stockholdings, and are found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the 
excessive payments will be treated as a dividend. If such payments constitute payment for property, they should be 
treated by the payor as a capital expenditure and by the recipient as part of the purchase price. In the absence of 
evidence to justify other treatment, excessive payments . . . will be included in gross income of the recipient.”);  See 
generally Sikon, supra note 81 (discussing characterization and tax treatment of compensation that is deemed 
unreasonable). 
102
 See DEFRA, supra note 78. 
103
 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71. 
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YEAR 
ENACTED 
TYPE OF 
COMPENSATION 
IMPOSED ON 
EMPLOYER 
(deduction denial) 
IMPOSED ON 
EMPLOYEE 
(additional tax) 
1984 Golden Parachute §280G §4999 
1993 Annual §162(m)  
2004 Nonqualified Deferred  §409A 
 
1.  Golden Parachute Compensation: Sections 280G and 4999 
 
Congress made its first attempt to directly regulate executive compensation via tax 
penalties when it enacted sections 280G and 4999, which apply to golden parachute 
agreements.104  The phrase “golden parachute” is a metaphor for a lucrative executive severance 
agreement that only becomes payable in the event of a change in the control of the company.105  
Although the terms of any particular golden parachute agreement will vary, “such an agreement 
generally provides for substantial bonuses and other benefits for top management and certain 
directors who may be forced to leave the target company or otherwise voluntarily leave upon a 
change in control.”106  These benefits are often worth in the aggregate upwards of “several times 
an executive’s yearly income.”107  
 
Golden parachute agreements proliferated in the early 1980s in response to a dramatic 
increase in the amount of takeover activity.108  But, as the use of golden parachute agreements 
                                                 
104
 See DEFRA, supra note 78. 
105
 More specifically, it is an agreement to make payments or provide other benefits to an executive if the 
company experiences a change in ownership, effective control, or the ownership of a substantial portion of its assets.  
See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i); see also generally William R. Spalding, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment 
Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1117-22 (1983) (explaining golden parachute agreements).   
106
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 1990).  In addition to cash, a golden parachute may provide 
continuing insurance coverage, a stock grant, or accelerated vesting of stock options.  See Stabile supra note 11.  For 
more on the panoply of benefits that fall under the rubric of golden parachute agreements, see generally Wilson and 
McGowan, Golden Parachutes, 396 TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIOS (BNA) (2008).  While termination is not a 
requirement under the golden parachute provisions, such agreements typically, but not always, have a termination 
clause requiring that the executive lose his job as a result of the change in control before payment under the 
agreement is triggered.  See Johnsen, supra note 90, at 910 (explaining “most golden parachutes currently in effect 
have three key components: (1) a change-of-control clause, (2) a termination clause, and (3) a compensation 
clause.”); Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 141-44 (discussing various golden parachute definitional issues).  The 
termination clause could require that the executive be dismissed outright, or it could allow the executive to 
voluntarily terminate his employment with the acquirer for “good reasons,” such as a situation where the executive 
is effectively forced out.  See Johnsen, supra, at 911-12.  In any event, “[t]he reality is that most top-level managers 
of target firms are gone within three years of the acquisition.”  Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: 
Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX. REV. 125, 127 (2001); See also Spalding, supra note 105 at 1132 (noting that change 
of control “normally” results in change in executive personnel). 
107
  Spalding, supra note 105, at 1120.  
108
 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 199 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter DEFRA Blue Book] 
(explaining that golden parachute provisions were enacted in response to heightened merger and acquisition 
activity); Henry F. Johnson, Government Regulation of Business: Golden Parachutes Revisited, 23 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 121 (1988) (referring to golden parachutes as “roadblocks” that have been “created” to deter “unwanted 
takeovers”); Johnsen, supra note 106, at 909 (explaining that “risk-shifting nature of golden parachutes makes them 
the most reasonable . . . alternative[] for dealing with the disequilibrium caused by increased takeover activity”); 
David V. Maurer, Golden Parachutes – Executive Compensation or Executive Overreaching?, 9 J. CORP. L. 346 
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gained momentum, so too did rigorous debate as to their propriety:  in particular, whether golden 
parachutes are ultimately good or bad for corporations, shareholders, and the overall economy.109  
Congress stepped into this fray, and in 1984 determined excessive golden parachutes in many 
instances inappropriately hinder acquisitive activity and impose direct and indirect costs on 
shareholders.110  Congress also concluded golden parachutes, “as a matter of policy, should be 
strongly discouraged."111  Congress ultimately decided to use the Code to do so.112   
 
At the time, and as discussed above, corporate deductibility for parachute payments was 
subject only to the reasonable compensation limits of section 162(a)(1).113  Assuming a payment 
was reasonable and thus deductible, section 162 operated to effectively reduce the cost of the 
payment.114  The Senate Finance Committee objected to the tax law subsidizing the cost of 
golden parachute payments in this way: 
 
The committee . . . is concerned that in many instances golden parachute contracts 
do little but assist an entrenched management team to remain in control. They also 
may provide corporate funds to subsidize officers or other highly compensated 
individuals. The committee is unwilling to permit the tax law to be used as a 
subsidy in such situations. In fact, the committee believes that a tax penalty 
should be enacted in those situations.115 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1984) (attributing abundance of parachute provisions to increased merger activity and noting that golden parachutes 
were “all but unheard of ten years [prior]”); Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 957-958 (1987) (“Golden parachutes became popular during a period of unprecedented 
takeover activity as a means of providing senior executives with enhanced security.”) (footnote omitted).      
109
 See Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 134, 148-49 (noting that golden parachutes were among the most hotly 
contested issues surrounding the takeover wave of the 1980s); Spalding, supra note 105, at 1121-22 (noting debate 
over propriety in spite of parachute popularity); Henry F. Johnson, Those ‘Golden Parachute’ Agreements: The 
Taxman Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 48 (1985) (“The opinions are lining up on either side of the issue 
as to whether [golden parachutes] are beneficial or detrimental to the concern’s future existence” & “commentators 
have been unable to agree on the validity and usefulness of golden parachutes.”). 
110
 See DEFRA Blue Book, supra note 108 at 199-200.   According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Congress was concerned about three possible effects of large golden parachutes: (1) in a takeover, they would result 
in the target’s shareholders being paid less for their stock, (2) they could discourage potential buyers, and (3) they 
could encourage management to pursue a transaction that was not in the best interest of the shareholders in order to 
reap the financial rewards of a parachute.  See id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Congress did consider non-tax legislation.  For example, the SEC submitted to Congress the Tender Offer 
Reform Act of 1984 which “curbed certain management practices in contests for corporate control, such as . . . 
‘golden parachutes’ . . . .”  P. John Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving State 
Authority over Internal Affairs while Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock through Federal Law, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1129 (1989).  See also Exchange Act – Tender Offers – Advisory Comm. Recommendations – 
SEC Response, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,511, at 86,675-76 (Mar. 28, 1984) 
(“SEC will support legislation on a number of points, including . . . the banning of ‘golden parachutes’ during a 
tender offer.”).  This act, however, did not pass.  See Allen E. Kelinsky, Comment, Promoting Shareholder Equality 
in Stock Accumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 93, 122 (1986).  
113
 Note that section 162(a)(1) is rarely applied to public companies, and where the IRS has attempted to do 
so it has been unsuccessful.  See supra note 90. 
114
 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
115
 S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS 
APPROVED BY THE COMM. ON MAR. 21, 1984 195 (COMM. PRINT 1984) [hereinafter DEFRA SENATE REPORT].   
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Congress accordingly enacted two new Code provisions to penalize parachute payments 
above a defined level: section 280G, which applies to companies, and section 4999, which 
applies to individuals.116  In short, section 280G disallows a deduction for any “excess parachute 
payment.”117  In other words, section 280G essentially presumes such payments are 
unreasonable.118 A company may rebut this presumption if it can establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the payments are reasonable compensation within the context of section 
280G.119  In this regard, however, Congress has stated “only in rare cases, if any, will any portion 
of a parachute payment be treated as reasonable compensation.”120 
 
If a company does make excess parachute payments, the cost to the corporation is, at a 
minimum, the foregone tax savings that a deduction would have produced.  In other words, the 
amount of taxes owed is increased due to the disallowed deduction.  Assuming a corporate rate 
                                                 
116
 See DEFRA supra note 78.  It should be noted that section 280G, and thereby section 4999, is limited in 
application.  First, it only applies to parachute payments made to a “disqualified individual.”  I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2).  
A disqualified individual is defined to include an employee or independent contractor who is also either a 
shareholder, an officer, or a highly compensated individual.  See I.R.C. § 280G(c).  A highly compensated 
individual is defined as one “who is (or would be if the individual were an employee) a member of the group 
consisting of the highest paid 1 percent of the employees of the corporation or, if less, the highest paid 250 
employees of the corporation.” Id.  Second, it does not apply to payments made to a disqualified individual if the 
company is a small business company (as defined in section 1361(b) but without regard to paragraph (1)(C)) or the 
stock of the company is not readily tradeable and three-quarters of the shareholders have approved the payments.  
See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(5).  
117
 More specifically, a “parachute payment” is defined as a payment in the nature of compensation that is 
contingent on a change in control, and also is in an amount greater than or equal to three times a “base amount.”  
I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A).  The base amount is the executive’s average annualized taxable compensation for the last 
five years or however long the executive has worked for the company if shorter.  See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) & (d)(2).  
The difference between the base amount and the parachute payment is the “excess parachute payment” and is 
nondeductible.  I.R.C. § 280G(a) & (b)(1).  Thus, a corporation providing an executive with an excess parachute 
payment may not deduct an amount greater than the base amount.   
For example, where a corporation makes a parachute payment of $3 million to an employee with a base 
amount of $1 million, the excess parachute payment is $2 million and is nondeductible.   See H.R. CONF. REP. at 
816-817 [hereinafter DEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT].  If, instead, the parachute payment was $2.9 million, then 
there would be no excess parachute payment and thus no deduction denial under section 280G.  See Zelinsky, supra 
note 20 at 159 (noting that this scheme can produce significant disparities in deductibility from small changes in 
compensation); Wolk, supra note 106 at 130. 
118
 DEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 117, at 816-17.  According to the Conference Committee 
Report, the presumption of unreasonableness reflects the view of Congress that affected executives are rarely 
“under-compensated.”  Id. at 817. 
119
 See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4).  Amounts that the taxpayer can establish by clear and convincing evidence are 
reasonable compensation for personal services actually rendered before the change in control are not treated as part 
of an excess parachute payment, but they are first offset by the base amount. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(B).  Thus, in 
the first example provided in note 117, should the taxpayer establish by clear and convincing evidence that $1.5 
million was reasonable compensation for services rendered before the change in control, the excess parachute 
payment would be reduced to $1.5 million (excess parachute payment – (reasonable compensation – base amount) 
or $2 million - ($1.5 million - $1 million)).  See DEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 117 at 817; Treas. Reg. § 
280G-1, A-39(b)(ex. 1).  In addition, amounts that the taxpayer can establish by clear and convincing evidence are 
reasonable compensation for personal services to be rendered on or after the date of the change in control are not 
treated as parachute payments at all. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(A).  For more on the types of evidence considered 
clear and convincing in these situations, see Treas. Reg. § 280G, Q&A 40-44.  See also generally Jamie Dietrich 
Hankinson, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax Gross-Ups Soften Their Impact to Executives and 
Square D Overinflates Their Coverage, 34 STETSON. L. REV. 767, 778 (2005). 
120
 DEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 117 at 817.   
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of 40 percent, this results in a 66.67 percent increase in the effective cost of the payment. 121  Put 
differently, disallowing a deduction for an expense effectively raises the corporation’s cost of 
that item to the full original cost.122  Unless the increased cost is shifted elsewhere and thus 
offset, it will ultimately reduce the corporation’s after-tax profits (i.e., the bottom line).123  
 
For its part, section 4999 imposes a nondeductible 20 percent tax on any person who 
receives an excess parachute payment.124  So, if the excess parachute payment was $1 million, 
then the executive’s excise tax would be $200,000.125  This is in addition to paying the taxes that 
are normally generated by compensation payments, such as income and payroll taxes.126  
Together, sections 280G and 4999 were expected “to make excessive parachute payments 
financially prohibitive” for a corporation to offer and an executive to accept.127   
 
To limit exposure to these dual notional penalties some companies carefully design their 
golden parachutes to come within the deductibility parameters set by section 280G.128  
Alternatively, some choose to pay an executive more on a current annual basis to compensate for 
the lack of, or limits on, golden parachute protection.129  More often, however, companies 
                                                 
121
 This can be explained mathematically by the formula: Marginal Rate /(1-Marginal Rate) = increase in cost 
of expense by denial of a deduction (.40/.60 =.6667). 
122
 See Zolt supra note 12 at 353. 
123
 The Corporation’s profits are decreased by the marginal tax rate times the expense denied. 
124
 See I.R.C. §§ 4999 (imposes 20 percent tax) and 275(a)(6) (disallows deduction for twenty percent tax 
imposed).  The corporation must withhold the tax from its payment to the individual if the payment constitutes 
“wages” within the meaning of section 3401 of the Code. See I.R.C. § 4999(c)(1). 
125
 This reduction in the after-tax benefit would in theory discourage an executive from contracting for a 
golden parachute above the level defined by section 280G.  If the parachute payment is just $1 less than three times 
the executive’s base amount then the additional tax does not apply.  In that way, the executive could in theory 
receive more after-taxes, even though the initial payment amount is less, if the additional tax is avoided.  This 
incentive to stay within the limits of section 280G has not worked because executives are able to contract out of the 
penalty.  See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.  
126
 In most cases, only the medicare portion of the executive’s payroll taxes will need to be paid on any 
parachute payment as it is likely that the executive’s taxable wages for purposes of the social security tax will have 
already exceeded the taxable maximum, which is $102,000 for 2008.  See supra note 36. 
127
 Stabile, supra note 12 at 91. See also Jamie Dietrich Hankinson, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall 
Flat: Tax Gross-Ups Soften Their Impact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their Coverage, 34 STETSON. L. 
REV. 767, 778 (2005) (referring to 280G and 4999 as “two pronged attack” and noting that Congress intended 
provisions to work together to reduce largesse of parachutes); Wolk, supra note 106 at 126 (describing that 
Congress had wanted to enact penalties against golden parachute payments, which became two new Code 
provisions: § 280G and § 4999).  Graef Crystal, a compensation expert, commented as follows on the enactment of 
the golden parachute provisions: “this is the first time in my memory that Congress . . . created what can only be 
considered a class of ‘Extraordinary Income’ for a compensation payment -- one that is taxed at higher rates than 
ordinary income.”  Manger’s Journal: Congress Thinks it Knows Best About Executive Compensation, WALL ST. J., 
July 30, 1984, at 1. 
128
 See, e.g., Dana M. Leonard, Comment, Golden Parachutes and the Draconian Measures Aimed at 
Control: Is Internal Revenue Code Section 280G the Proper Regulatory Mode of Shareholder Protection, 54 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1293, 1306-07 (1986) (discussing how § 280G merely imposes limits on rather than banning parachute 
payments and firms’ ability to avoid § 280G restrictions “by limiting the [parachute] payments to amounts less than 
three times the employee’s base amount.”); see also Miske, supra note 20 at 1680 (discussing how § 280G 
essentially codified a “salary multiple” to be used in calculating golden parachutes to stay within its limits and how 
firms often set this multiple at “299 percent of the executives’ base compensation.”). 
129
 See Stabile, supra note 12, at 92; see also Johnson, supra note 108, at 63 (discussing firms’ maneuvers to 
evade § 280G including, for example, paying executives cash signing bonuses).  This is also costly to the company 
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purposely forego a deduction in order to provide an executive with greater benefits.  Many 
companies go even further and reimburse the executive for the 20 percent excise tax incurred.130  
These additional payments, referred to as gross-up compensation, are also treated as excess 
parachute payments, and thus are nondeductible by the corporation and subject to the 20 percent 
excise tax in addition to taxes otherwise normally due on the executive’s compensation.131  A full 
gross-up will pay these taxes as well.132  Thus, the incidence (or economic burden) of the 20 
percent penalty tax is effectively shifted from the executive to the corporation.  
 
This practice, which Congress presumably did not anticipate, is more costly than it 
initially appears.  Gross-up payments, in combination with the denial of a deduction under 
section 280G, can triple a company’s after-tax cost of an excess parachute payment.133  For 
example, assume, as above, a $1 million excess parachute payment.  Further assume an 
individual income tax rate of 40 percent.  If the executive’s company agrees to pay the federal 
income and excise taxes on the excess parachute payment, then the executive receives, after 
                                                                                                                                                             
because the payments are mandatory rather than contingent on a change in control that might never occur.  Even in 
the presence of a parachute agreement, an executive’s base salary might be raised so that the base on which 
parachute payment status is determined is likewise raised.  This would reduce the likelihood that future payments 
will be subject to the penalties, but still increases the company’s overall compensation costs as compared to what the 
compensation level might be in the absence of the penalties. 
130
 See Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Comm., 
109th Cong. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Backdating Hearing] (testimony of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, 
Temple University) (“From my reading of executive compensation contracts and disclosures, I have found many 
corporations are willing to not only forgo deductions for excess parachute payments as defined under section 280(g) 
[sic], but are also grossing up the executive’s compensation to pay for the excise taxes levied on the executive.”).  A 
recent study shows that “two-thirds of CEOs and 60% of other named executive officers are entitled to have their 
severance increased to cover the extra taxes [of exceeding limits].”  See Perri Capell, CEO Compensation Survey (A 
Special Report); Terminated? Who Cares? Severance-pay Packages for CEOs appear to be Coming Down; But 
Slowly, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at R4; Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: Behind Soaring Executive 
Pay, Decades of Failed Restraints; Instead of Damping Rewards, Disclosure, Taxes, Options Helped Push Them 
Higher; Return of Golden Parachutes, WALL ST. J. Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (“By 2004, 77% of 1,000 public concerns 
tracked by consulting firm Tower Perrins offered [gross-ups].”).  
131
 See Wolk, supra note 106 at 140; see also George B. Paulin, Executive Compensation and Changes in 
Control: A Search for Fairness, COMP. & BENEFITS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 30, 33 (“[Al]l gross-ups become 
additional excess parachute payments themselves, subject to the excise tax and not deductible to the company.”).  
Paulin explains that “the gross-up payments must also be grossed up, and these gross-ups must also be grossed up, 
and so on.”  Id. 
132
 There are gross-up provisions that provide less than a full gross-up.  For more information on those 
provisions, as well as full gross-ups and how to compute them, see generally Wolk, supra note 106, and Wilson & 
McGowan, supra note 106. 
133
 See id. at A39 (“[B]ecause gross-ups usually cost about 200% of the excise tax amount (plus the amount 
of the excise tax itself, for a total payment to or for the benefit of the executive of approximately 300% of the excise 
tax), they increase the § 280G ‘penalty’ paid by the corporation.”);  See also Wolk, supra note 106 at 140 (“Because 
the [gross-up] is itself subject to the excise tax, the taxes rapidly pyramid, making gross-ups extraordinarily 
costly.”); Hankinson, supra note 127, at 771, 788 (explaining “gross-ups eliminate the punitive effect on the 
executive by imposing greater costs on the corporation” and using example to show how, in addition to loss of 
corporate tax deduction, “the total cost to the corporation of [a] $3,000,000 golden parachute payment, when the 
payment is grossed up for the executive’s excise and individual income taxes, increases to $9,000,000.”). The 
justifications companies provide for paying gross-ups include the following: “allows corporations the freedom to 
design change in control plans and agreements without the need to worry about benefit cutbacks and the anger and 
frustration they engender;” and “gross-ups have the overwhelming advantage of helping to focus management’s 
attention on running the business in the very difficult pre-merger period.” Wilson & McGowan, supra note 106, at 
A39. 
  
 28 
taxes, $1 million.  As far as the executive is concerned it is as if the penalty tax does not exist.134  
But to provide the executive with $1 million after taxes, the company must spend $2.5 million: 
$1 million to the executive and $1.5 million to the IRS for taxes.135  And this is not the only cost 
the company incurs; the company is also denied a deduction for the $2.5 million payment, which 
implicitly costs the company $1 million.136  Thus, it costs the company $3.5 million in total to 
pay the executive $1 million after taxes.  
 
In sum, Congress wanted to discourage companies from authorizing golden parachute 
payments above a defined level.  Congress implemented its plan by using the Code to impose 
penalties on payments that are, in its view, excessive.  The theory was that the tax penalties 
would in most instances render them too costly to authorize or receive.  The reality is many 
companies continue to authorize golden parachutes that, if triggered, would provide payments 
above the limit defined as reasonable by Congress.  In that way, these companies have 
voluntarily assumed potentially greater costs than Congress imposed. 
 
The irony of course is that Congress purportedly wanted to protect shareholders from the 
direct and indirect costs of golden parachutes.137  More surprising, however, is that although it 
was apparent at or shortly after enactment that the golden parachute provisions were not only 
ineffective but also suffered from a variety of defects, they became the archetype for regulating 
executive compensation via tax penalties.138 
 
                                                 
134
   See id. (“The employee will be in the same economic position as if an excise tax did not exist.”). 
135
 This can be explained mathematically by the formula: Pre-Tax Pay = After-Tax Pay/(1-tax rate).  This 
formula is applied here as follows: $2,500,000 = $1,000,000/(1-.40-.20).  See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence 
Lokken, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 5.8.2 (2008) (providing formula and noting that “all 
federal income taxes reimbursed by a tax reimbursement agreement are taxed, regardless of the number of rounds 
involved”); Wolk, supra note 20, at 139-40. 
136
 This can be explained mathematically by the formula: Cost of Foregone Deduction = Expense x Tax Rate.  
Here, the $2,500,000 nondeductible compensation payment multiplied by an assumed 40% tax rate results in a 
foregone deduction worth $1,000,000. 
137
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing concerns over golden parachute payments). 
138
 Section 280G has been widely criticized as an ineffective deterrent of the use of golden parachutes to 
repel takeovers.  See Wolk, supra note 106 at 127-28 (noting that because provision imposes penalties only on 
excessive payments actually made to employees, section 280G does not deter parachutes large enough to actively 
discourage takeover); Hankinson, supra note 127 at 783-89 & nn. 108-146 (highlighting examples of ways §§ 280G 
and 4999 can be circumvented); see also generally Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for 
Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 417-19 (noting limited effectiveness of 
§ 280G).   
As one commentator noted soon after the provisions were passed, “Congress has, as usual, made an opening 
move in a corporate chess game and neglected to consider its opponents’ countermoves.” Graef S. Crystal, Congress 
Thinks It Knows Best About Executive Compensation, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1984, at 16.  Shortly after enactment of 
the two provisions, others hypothesized that indemnification provisions in executive contracts would arrange for the 
corporation to bear the 20% excise tax.  See Edwin T. Hood & John J. Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements: 
Reasonable Compensation or Disguised Bribery?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 213-14 (1985) (assessing effects of § 
280G and § 4999 and referring to provisions as “rather draconian”). 
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2.  Annual Compensation: Section 162(m) 
 
In 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m), which applies to annual compensation paid to 
executives.139  It was enacted in response to intense popular sentiments regarding executive 
compensation levels.140  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, most Americans believed 
executives were over-compensated.141  At the time, there was a palpable widening gap between 
America’s rich and poor, and an economic recession that was adding to the disparity.142  Intense 
media coverage of contemporary executive pay practices, depicting the sharp contrast between 
the situation of highly-paid executives and that of ordinary Americans, only further intensified 
public sentiments.143  These sentiments stemmed not only from the belief that executives were 
excessively compensated, but also from the belief that executives as a whole were unaffected by 
or even prospering despite the flagging performance of their companies.144 
  
                                                 
139
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71.  In the 
same legislation, Congress also enacted changes to the Code that more broadly affected high-income taxpayers, such 
as raising the ordinary income tax rate for some taxpayers who were previously in the highest rate bracket and 
removing the cap on the Medicare portion of payroll taxes.  Pub. L. No. 103-66, sections 8201, 8202, & 8207.  
140
 See infra note 155 (“Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the 
subject of scrutiny and criticism.  The committee believes that excessive compensation will be reduced if  . . . .”).  
See also e.g. Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? 
Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. 28, May-June 1992 (noting that not since 1930s had compensation earned the 
attention of as many public officials as it did in the early 1990s); Louis M. Thompson, Jr., The SEC Targets 
Executive Pay, 15 Directors & Boards No.4, at 48, June 22, 1991 (editorializing that it “did not take a whiz kid” to 
realize that Congress would get involved with such an “emotionally charged issue” as excessive compensation in 
time of recession); Murphy, supra note 19, at 740 (“Section 162(m) . . . was a response to the populist desire to 
penalize highly paid executives.”). 
141
 See Derek Bok, The Cost of Talent 95 (The Free Press (1993) (recounting media descriptions of executive 
salaries as “‘[m]ind-numbing,’” . . . and “‘eyepopping,’” and  noting that “[b]y 1990, almost everyone seemed to 
agree that executive pay had reached unseemly heights.”). 
142
 For information on American economic cycles, see National Bureau of Economic Research, Business 
Cycle Expansions and Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.  In the decade leading up to the 
enactment of § 162(m), executive pay suddenly grew at a pace nearly four times that of the average worker.  See 
Mark A. Sargent & Dennis R. Honabach, Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, PROXY RULES HDBK. 4:1 
(2006) (citation omitted). This was in contrast to the five immediately prior decades (from the Great Depression era 
to the mid-to-late 1970s), during which executive compensation levels remained relatively steady in relation to the 
pay of the average worker.  See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L. J. 59, 62 (1992) (explaining that in 1990 executives were earning 85 times the 
salary of an average factory worker, up from 42 times the salary of an average wage-earner at beginning of decade); 
Vagts, supra note 42, at 246.   Additionally, in 1986 Congress reduced the highest marginal tax rate to 28 percent 
from its already historic low since 1931 of 50 percent; just 25 years earlier, the highest marginal rate was 90 percent.  
See Tax foundation, Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1913-2008, available at 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/151.html. 
143
 See, e.g., Brownstein & Panner, supra note 140 (noting that recession had turned executive compensation 
into “front page news”); Murphy, supra note 19 at 713 (recounting media fixation on executive compensation and 
explaining that issue reached “national prominence” during 1991); Bok, supra note 141. 
144
 See generally Sargent & Honabach, supra note 142 (noting comparatively larger increases in CEO 
compensation during 1980s than shareholder returns and growing disconnect between pay and performance). See 
also Jill Abramson & Christopher J. Chipello, Compensation Gap: High Pay of CEOs Traveling with Bush Touches 
a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991 at A1 (reporting gross disparity between salaries of American 
executives and those of their highly productive Japanese counterparts: despite American economic downturn, 
executives traveling with President Bush to Japan earned an average of $2 million in previous year, while Japanese 
executives earned an average of $300,000-$400,000).  See also supra note 19. 
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The congressional response to these sentiments was section 162(m), which disallows a 
deduction for annual compensation that might otherwise be allowable as an ordinary and 
necessary business expense under section 162(a)(1).145  Specifically, section 162(m) prohibits a 
deduction in excess of $1 million for compensation paid by a publicly held corporation to its 
CEO and the three other highest paid officers at the company.146  In other words, regardless of 
the amount paid, the deduction is limited to $1 million.147  Compensation in excess of $1 million 
is thus in effect deemed unreasonable.148  
 
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.  Commissions, performance-based 
compensation, qualified retirement plan contributions, and nontaxable fringe benefits are all 
specifically excepted from the $1 million deduction limitation.149  The most significant of these 
exceptions is the one for performance-based compensation.  Compensation is performance-based 
only if it is “payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals.”150  
Such goals must be “established by a compensation committee composed of outside directors, 
approved by shareholders, and certified by the company’s compensation committee as having 
been met.”151  
 
It also noteworthy that the $1 million limit only applies with regard to the specified 
executives if they are employed as such on the last day of the taxable year.152  A company, 
therefore, “may give an executive any amount of non-performance compensation, however large, 
and still not fall within the reach of Section 162(m) – as long as the payment of this amount is 
deferred until the executive’s departure.”153  As a result, most executive retirement plans 
(commonly referred to as nonqualified deferred compensation), which are large and 
commonplace, are not limited by section 162(m).154  
 
The Senate Finance Committee believed “excessive compensation [would] be reduced if 
the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation) paid to the top 
executives of publicly held corporations [was] limited.”155  Section 162(m) thus appears to have 
                                                 
145
 This approach is similar to section 280G which was enacted a decade earlier.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
146
 See I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(1) & (2) and § 162(m)(3), as interpreted by IRS Notice 2007-49.  For purposes of 
section § 162(m), a publicly held corporation is “any corporation issuing any class of common equity securities 
required to be registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”  I.R.C. § 162(m)(2).  
147
 The $1 million limit is lowered (but not below zero) by the amount of any excess parachute payment 
which would have been considered compensation within the meaning of section 162(m) if section 280G had not 
disallowed a deduction.  See I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(4)(A) & (F).  
148
 In fact, the heading of section 162(m) reads as follows: “Certain excessive employee remuneration.” 
149
 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4). 
150
 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C). 
151
 Stabile, supra note 11, at 87.  Treasury regulations elaborate that a performance goal “must state, in terms 
of an objective formula or standard, the method for computing the amount of compensation payable to the employee 
if the goal is attained.” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii).  
152
 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). 
153
 See Backdating Hearing, supra note 130, at 4 (testimony of Lucian A. Bebchuk, Professor of Law, 
Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School) 
154
 Adding the value of this type of compensation to a CEO’s “aggregate salary during the CEO’s service 
roughly triple[s] the amount of the CEO’s non-performance pay.” Id.  See also supra notes 67-76, 96 and 
accompanying text for background information on nonqualified plans, and infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of 
section 409A, which imposes a broad range of restrictions on nonqualified plans and penalties for noncompliance.   
155
 See 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877. 
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two aims: (1) to curtail levels of executive pay, and (2) to encourage a stronger connection 
between pay and performance.156  Stated differently, section 162(m) attempts to affect both “the 
amount [and] type of compensation paid to executives.”157  Neither of these goals appears to 
have been met.  As contemporaneously predicted and subsequently borne out, section 162(m) 
has not restrained compensation levels,158 and “has been at best, only marginally effective . . . in 
making [executive pay] more responsive to performance.”159 
 
To begin, it appears 162(m)’s initial effect was to lead companies whose CEOs earned 
less than $1 million to increase base salary levels to $1 million.160  Furthermore, although section 
162(m) was designed to discourage corporations from paying excessive non-performance-based 
executive compensation by making it more costly to do so, as was seen with section 280G, many 
companies are all too willing to forego a deduction in order to pay whatever compensation they 
decide is best.161   
                                                 
156
 See id.  Notably, Senate hearings from 1991 and 1992 feature a familiar refrain amongst committee 
members regarding the need to tie pay to performance.  See, e.g., Executive Compensation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 102d CONG. 2 (statement by Sen. Boren, Chairman, S. 
Subcomm. on Taxation) (“Of course, this is an economy founded on free enterprise principles . . . [s]o we would be 
less concerned about the amount . . . paid to executives if we believed that pay tracked performance.”).   
157
 Stabile, supra note 11, at 95-99 (assessing “potential effectiveness of the Code as an increased constraint 
on the amount or type of compensation,” and concluding that regardless of the outcome, “it should not be so used” 
because “[c]ompensation is a matter for the market and private parties”). 
158
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 19, at 739 (“I predict that 162(m) will . . . result in higher rather than lower 
levels of executive compensation).  A recent report prepared for Congress in preparation for a hearing on issues 
related to the tax treatment of executive compensation commented “[s]tudies have indicated that the deduction 
limitation may have led to some substitution away from salary compensation toward performance-based 
compensation, but that growth in overall executive compensation has not been reduced.” Compensation Report, 
supra note 4. 
159
 See Backdating Hearing, supra note 130, at 1 (testimony of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, 
Temple University) (“I’d also like to state up front that, based upon my own research, the research of others, and 
anecdotal reports, that section 162(m) has been at best, only marginally effective in limiting executive pay or in 
making it more responsive to performance.”); id. at 1 (testimony of Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library) 
(“The data show that the disparity between pay and performance is enormous and growing.”); Nancy L. Rose & 
Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer 
Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 141 (2002).   
160
 See CEO Compensation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 108th CONG. 
(2003) [hereinafter CEO Compensation Hearing] (testimony of Brian Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business 
School) (“The pay trend ... makes it look as if [162(m)] were passed with the intention of accelerating, not curbing, 
CEO pay increases.”); Backdating Hearing, supra note 130 at 1 (testimony of Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate 
Library) (“When the tax code was changed to prevent executive compensation of over $1 million to be deducted 
unless it was tied to performance . . . everyone got a raise to $1 million.”). 
161
 See Backdating Hearing, supra note 130, at 1 (testimony of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, 
Temple University) (“For example in 2005 my research indicates that at least 250 corporations paid one or more 
executives salary, i.e., non performance-based compensation, in excess of $1 million, 988 paid one or more 
executives total cash compensation in excess of $1 million, and 1,335 paid one or more executives total 
compensation in excess of $1 million.  . . .  In research conducted using data from the mid-1990’s, Jennifer Yin and I 
found that nearly 40 percent of corporations admitted to forfeiting deductions because of section 162(m). My 
prediction is that this percentage is much higher today. Especially as corporations shift from stock options to 
restricted stock in the wake of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R which required the expensing of 
stock options.”) (Referring to Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions 
Under Internal Revenue Code § 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 322-23 (2005)). 
But see Polsky, supra note 20, at 913 (concluding that under a particular management model – the managerial power 
model –  “it would be rare for firms (particularly high-profile ones) to forfeit significant amounts of deductions” 
  
 32 
 
More significantly, the performance-based exception had at least three notable effects on 
executive compensation.162  First, “[e]ven for those companies for whom preserving the 
deduction is important, the performance-based compensation exception to the $ 1 million limit 
renders section 162(m) virtually meaningless.”163  As an initial matter, satisfying the 
performance-based requirements is not challenging.  Treasury regulations provide that a 
performance goal does not need to be “based upon an increase or positive result under a business 
criterion and could include, for example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic 
losses.”164  Furthermore, once the threshold requirements have been met, there is no limit to the 
amount of performance-based compensation that can be deducted.165  
 
Second, overall compensation levels increased instead of decreasing or merely remaining 
relatively steady.166  The increase is, in part, attributable to the need to add a risk premium167 to 
the amount of compensation paid to executives receiving performance-based pay.168  It is also 
attributable to the fact that performance-based pay often ended up being more lucrative than 
originally anticipated.169  Performance-based pay can be awarded in a variety of forms, such as 
cash or stock, but the quintessential form is the stock option.170  This is so because a stock 
                                                                                                                                                             
because of “the potential negative public response”).  The SEC requires companies to disclose their policy regarding 
compliance with § 162(m).  See Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests, 
Exchange Act Release No. 7032, 55 SEC Docket 1352 (Nov. 22, 1993). 
162
 In addition, a number of commentators have catalogued a variety of other section 162(m) flaws: the $1 
million limit is arbitrary, not indexed for inflation, and inflexible as to the circumstances of individual companies.  
See Miske, supra note 20, at 1687-89; Murphy, supra note 19, at 738-40; Polsky, supra note 20, at 920-25; Stabile, 
supra note 11, at 97. 
163
 Stabile, supra note 11, at 88.  See also FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 156 (Times Books 2003) (referring to performance-based exception as “a 
loophole large enough to fly a private jet through.”). 
164
 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i).  Thus, while it cannot be certain to be met when set, the bar can be set 
fairly low so that the likelihood of meeting the goal is high.  See id. 
165
 The general rules of section 162(a) continue to apply, but recall that section 162(a)(1) is rarely applied to 
public companies, and where the IRS has attempted to do so it has been unsuccessful.  See supra note 90.   
166
 See supra note 158.  See also Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 9 
(2003-2004) (“Beginning around 1990, stock options began to take off as the principal method of compensating 
senior executives, dwarfing cash salary payments in significance. Once installed throughout corporate America, 
stock option arrangements caused executive compensation to balloon wildly.”).  But cf. Richard A. Booth, Executive 
Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. Rev. 269, 279-281 (2005) 
(noting that “despite perceptions to the contrary, executive pay has not increased significantly as a percentage of 
corporate income in the last twenty-five years”).  Also, the regulations under section 162(m) prohibit “discretion to 
increase the amount of compensation payable that would otherwise be due upon attainment of the goal.” Treas. Reg. 
1.162-27(e)(2)(iii)(A) (1994).  This rule not only encourages boards to set a high maximum, since it cannot later be 
increased,  but commentators have also pointed out that boards rarely scale back pay.  See Polsky, supra note 20, at 
911; Murphy, supra note 19, at 739. 
167
 In theory, an executive receiving all or a portion of his pay based on performance risks receiving little or 
no pay if the company does not perform as expected.  To offset this risk, a premium is added to the amount of 
compensation paid to the executive if the company performs well, increasing overall compensation above the level 
that would have been paid absent the presence of performance-based risk. 
168
 See Polsky, supra note 20, at 887-88; Murphy, supra note 19, at 739. 
169
 See Polsky, supra note 20, at 909 (noting that the public often fails to appreciate the value of stock option 
privileges at the time of grant and the time value component of an option).  See generally Partnoy, supra note 163, at 
156-159. 
170
 See Polsky, supra note 20, at 889; Murphy, supra note 19, at 738; Partnoy, supra note at 163, at 156. 
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option’s value is inherently tied to the performance of the corporation’s stock if granted with an 
exercise price equal to or greater than fair market value at the time of the grant: it is only 
valuable if the stock price rises.171  Stock options became significantly more popular after the 
enactment of 162(m).172  This timing happened to coincide with the beginning of a stock market 
boom and thus led to incredibly handsome rewards for executives – certainly in comparison to 
ordinary workers.173  
 
Third, the shift to performance-based compensation as a significant if not the largest 
portion of an executive compensation package “encourage[d] executives to focus on and 
manipulate short-term earnings at the expense of long-term value creation” that is in the interests 
                                                 
171
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A).  Stock appreciation rights are also inherently performance-based 
if the amount of  “compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the stock 
after the date of the grant or award.”  Id.   
172
 See, e.g., Backdating Hearing, supra note 130, at 1 (testimony of Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate 
Library) (“When the tax code was changed to prevent executive compensation of over $1 million to be deducted 
unless it was tied to performance, . . .  everyone got boat-loads of options. The very definition of a “mega-grant” had 
to be changed, so it now can be as much as eight times the CEO’s base pay and bonus.”); Partnoy, supra note at 163, 
at 157 (“FASB officials knew that the $1 million cap on non-performance-based pay would lead companies to 
switch to stock options.”); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder 
Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 708-09 (1997).  But See See Lora Cicconi, Blaming the Tax Code for the 
Backdating Scandal, 114 Tax Notes 1129, 1140 (March 19, 2007). 
173
 See Sargent, supra note 166.  Conversely, executive fortunes do not appear to be similarly impacted by 
stock market bust cycles.  See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform:  The Derivatives Market and Executive 
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 301, 312 (Spring/Summer 1995) (“A final criticism of stock options is that they 
carry no downside risk for the executive. As one observer noted, ‘(i)t's as if the executive got the company to agree 
to the following coin toss: Heads, I win big; tails, I lose nothing.’”); Linda Barrett, Unsharing the Wealth:  Recent 
Economic Volatility Has Greatly Impacted Executive Compensation, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 319-20 (Fall 2001) 
(“The problem with [an options repricing] plan is that it gives an executive little incentive to implement strategies to 
increase the company's stock price thus rewarding the executive even if the company's performance is poor.”); Linda 
J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem:  A Collective Approach To Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 
66 (Winter 1992) (“Many compensation packages are constructed so that the executive profits in good times and is 
protected in bad. If stock prices decline, the executive may lose his bonus, but he may have the ability to renegotiate 
the option portion of his existing plan to lower the strike price, the price at which the option can be exercised.  Thus, 
the executive is rewarded regardless of his or the corporation's performance and is simultaneously insulated from the 
ravages suffered by fellow shareholders if stock value declines.”); Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive 
Compensation Through a Partnership Lens: A Tool To Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153, 216 (Spring 
2000) (“Repricing protects executives from losses, while allowing them to profit if the stock price merely rises back 
to the original exercise price.”). But cf. Booth, supra note 166, at 283-4 (asserting that repricing may serve valid 
business purposes).  In fact, the stock market crash of 1929 and the early years of the ensuing depression did not 
even negatively affect the compensation level of many executives. Most bonus payments, of course, disappeared as 
profits did, but salaries remained largely intact.  See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the 
Markets or For the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 246 (1983) (explaining that stock market crash had “mild[] effects” 
on executive salaries, which remained “stable”); George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 
54 Harv. L. Rev. 743 (1941) (explaining that bonus payments “either ceased or were sharply reduced.”).  Indeed, 
some managers received salary increases to compensate for lost incentive pay. See  id. at 743 (noting that executives 
were compensated with increased salaries in 1930 and 1931).  More recently, “in 2000[, w]hile shareholders got 
hammered, many compensation committees scrambled to cushion their chief executives from feeling any real pain, 
granting massive blocks of new stock options in some cases and in others forgiving corporate loans.”  Business 
Week (April 16, 2001) available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_16/b3728013.htm. 
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of shareholders.174  In some cases, executives trying to manage their company’s earnings, and 
hence stock price, even committed accounting fraud.175 
 
In the end, a tax provision can only encourage or discourage behavior.  It can neither 
prevent companies from paying excessive compensation nor compel a particular compensation 
structure; it can only make it more costly for a company to do what it wants to do.  This does not 
seem troublesome to the companies: despite all the ways to get around the 162(m) limit, a 
number of companies continue to pay compensation that is not deductible.176 
 
3.  Nonqualified Deferred Compensation: Section 409A 
 
Recently, Congress responded to another surge in negative popular sentiment regarding 
executive compensation levels and practices with the enactment of section 409A.177  It applies to 
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, and penalizes certain practices that were 
publicly revealed and widely disapproved during various corporate scandals in the early 2000s, 
in particular the collapse of Enron Corporation.178  Those practices, under the rules governing the 
taxation of compensation, pushed the limits on securing an executive’s deferred compensation 
while also providing the executive with the benefit of income tax deferral.179 
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 Murphy, supra note 19, at 739.  See also JCT Enron Report, infra note 182, at 3 (“Although the intent of 
many of Enron’s stock-based compensation programs was to align the interests of shareholders and executives, the 
Enron experience raises a potential conflict between short-term earnings from which executives can reap immediate 
rewards and longer-term interests of shareholders.”); Sargent, supra note 166, at 12-13 (discussing the argument that 
an “over-reliance on stock option compensation [] has led to an equally unhealthy preoccupation with short-term 
maintenance of stock prices”). 
175
 See Partnoy, supra note at 163, at 157; Sargent, supra note 166, at 10 (“the use of stock options created an 
incentive to use accounting devices designed to prop up the stock price”). 
176
 See supra note161 (noting forfeited deductions).  See also Polsky, supra note 20 at 900-901 (discussing 
why companies might forfeit deductions, including the possibility that it makes more after-tax economic sense). 
177
 See AJCA, supra note 79 (discussing scope of Act). 
178
 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Finance, Floor Speech of Chairman Grassley 
on Tax Loophole Closers in JOBS Act, Oct. 11, 2004, available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prg101104.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2008) (referring to nonqualified 
deferred compensation legislation as “Enron reforms”); infra note 182, at 12 (“Enron’s compensation arrangements 
received considerable media attention in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy”);  William A. Drennan, Enron-
Inspired Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules: “If You Don’t Know Where You’re Going, You Might Not Get 
There, 73 TENN. L. REV. 415, 417-18 (2006) (noting that scandals surrounding “Enron, WorldCom, Global 
Crossing, Tyco, HealthSouth, and others” were met with large amounts of publicity and that such publicity “created 
an environment conducive to fundamental reforms in . . . corporate governance.”); Ethan Yale and Gregg D. Polsky, 
Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007) (referring to executive pay as “topic 
of significant interest” for academics, journalists, and legislators, in aftermath of scandals surrounding  Enron and 
New York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard Grasso). Prior to the enactment of Code section 409A, Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was aimed at corporate governance, accounting, and corporate fraud 
issues. 
179
 See JCT COMPENSATION REPORT, supra note 4 at 2 (“Prior to the enactment of section 409A, the tax 
treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation was governed by general tax principles.  Several practices had 
developed that allowed executives deferral of income inclusion, but inappropriate degrees of security and control 
over amounts deferred.  Section 409A was intended to address these practices.”). 
Section 409A is broader than any other provision discussed in this article.  Subject to exceptions, it can apply 
to any taxpayer who defers compensation under a nonqualified plan; it is not limited to executives.  See supra note 
79.  Nevertheless, the impetus for enactment was certain executive compensation practices that came to light in the 
aftermath of the collapse of Enron. 
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As discussed in subsection A, if compensation is deferred outside of a qualified plan, it 
may or may not be subject to current income taxation even though receipt has been deferred.180  
The tax consequences will depend on the extent to which the taxpayer’s interest in the 
compensation is secured.  There are two possibilities: either (1) the employee in some way risks 
losing the deferred compensation and as a result is not subject to current income taxation on it, or 
(2) the employee does not significantly risk losing the deferred compensation and as a result it is 
subject to current income taxation.181  The nonqualified plans Enron offered its executives did 
not subject them to current taxation, and yet events revealed that their interests in plan funds 
were fairly well protected.182  
 
Enron executives, aware of the company’s impending financial crisis, took early 
distributions totaling more than $53 million from their nonqualified plans within weeks of Enron 
filing for bankruptcy.183  Around the same time, normal administrative procedures prevented 
employees from making changes to the investments in their qualified 401(k) retirement plans for 
two and one-half weeks.184  Many rank-and-file Enron employees had invested a significant 
percentage of their plan balance in Enron stock, and by the time the “blackout” period was over 
they had lost not only their jobs but also a considerable amount of their retirement savings.185 
   
The revelation that Enron executives had received handsome benefits while employees 
lost their savings prompted both public resentment and Congressional concern.186  The Senate 
Finance Committee commissioned an investigation into that and other matters.187  The resulting 
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 See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text (discussing the taxation of deferred compensation). 
181
 See id. (same). 
182
 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108th CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY 2 
(2003) [hereinafter JCT ENRON REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/joint/jcs-3-03/vol1/index.html.  
183
 See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 182, at 14, 627.  These distributions drained Enron of available cash 
just prior to bankruptcy.  See id. at 636.  They were, however, also recoverable under bankruptcy law. See  Drennan, 
supra note 22, at 442-43. 
184
 See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 182, at 38. A change in recordkeepers triggered the “blackout” 
period.  Such changes are “a normal part of qualified plan operations.”  Id. 
185
 In the aggregate, 62 percent (or roughly $1.3 billion dollars) of  401(k) plan assets were invested in Enron 
stock.  See James J. Choi et al., Are Empowerment and Education Enough?: Under-Diversification in 401(k) Plans 3 
(2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/forum/200509bpea_laibson.pdf.   
During the blackout period, “the price of Enron stock fell from $15.40 to $9.98.”  JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 
182, at 38.  Enron’s demise also affected employees’ interests in the Enron Employee Stock Ownership Plan.  See 
Id. at 13.  
186
 See, e.g., Michael J. Hussey, Has Congress Stopped Executives From Raiding the Bank?  A Critical 
Analysis of I.R.C. § 409A, 75 UMKC L. REV. 437 (2006) (noting that “sharp contrast” between executive bailouts 
and average employee hardship in Enron collapse caused “general outcry over nonqualified deferred 
compensation”); Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in its Proper Season, 
67 OHIO ST. L. J. 347 (2006) (recounting how nonqualified deferred compensation “grabbed headlines” in wake of 
Enron scandal). 
187
 The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) (comprised of economists, attorneys, and 
accountants who, on a nonpartisan basis, assist Members in both houses of Congress on tax legislation) was directed 
to report on “the compensation arrangements of Enron employees, including tax-qualified retirement plans, 
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, and other arrangements, in order to analyze the factors that may 
have contributed to the loss of benefits and the extent to which losses were experienced by different groups of 
employees.”  See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 182, at 2. 
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Enron Report found that broad interpretations of then-current law allowed Enron executives to 
delay payment of income taxes on their nonqualified deferred compensation until it was 
received, even though events indicated they maintained security and control over the amounts 
deferred, including the ability to request early withdrawals when the company was in financial 
distress.188  
 
Congress subsequently enacted section 409A to address nonqualified plan practices it 
considered inappropriate.189  Like section 4999 two decades earlier, Congress imposed an 
additional tax on executives who defer compensation under a plan that does not meet the 
requirements of section 409A.  More specifically, participants in plans that fail to satisfy section 
409A’s requirements are immediately subject to current taxation, plus interest, on all 
compensation deferred under the plan to the extent the compensation is not subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture or has not been previously included in gross income.190  Section 
409A also imposes an additional twenty percent tax on the non-complying compensation that 
was included in the participant’s income for the taxable year.191  
 
In light of Congress’s prior tax penalty enactments in the area of executive compensation 
-- either denying a deduction to the corporation or imposing an additional tax on the executive, 
use here of an additional tax makes some sense because the compensation at issue is already 
nondeductible by the company until included in the executive’s income.192  In fact, the Enron 
Report commented:    
 
Enron allowed its executives to defer significant amounts of compensation even 
though Enron had to forego a current deduction with respect to such amounts. The 
fact that Enron was apparently indifferent to the deferral of its deduction provides 
further support for the need for changes to the tax treatment of nonqualified 
deferred compensation. Changes to the present-law rules regarding the taxation of 
deferred compensation would reduce the amount of income deferred.193 
                                                 
188
 See id. at 40 .  The nonqualified plans avoided current income inclusion for the executives presumably by, 
inter alia, subjecting receipt of the deferred compensation to a substantial limitation or restriction: early withdrawals 
incurred a 10 percent forfeiture penalty (a “haircut”) and also resulted in the executive being prohibited from 
participating in the plan for three years.  See id. at 622.  These practices raised additional concerns regarding the 
deferred compensation statutory structure which is designed to provide qualified plans significantly more favorable 
tax treatment than nonqualified plans in order to encourage employers to sponsor retirement plans for the benefit of 
their rank-and-file employees.  In that regard the Enron Report commented that: “Enron’s deferred compensation 
plans allowed executives to receive benefits similar to those of qualified plans.  To the extent that it is possible for 
executives to defer taxes and have security and flexibility through nonqualified arrangements, this undermines the 
qualified retirement plan system. If executives can obtain the result they desire through the use of nonqualified plans 
and arrangements, there will be less incentive for companies to maintain qualified plans, which will result in rank 
and file employees losing pension coverage.”  Id. at 40. 
189
 See supra note 179. 
190
 See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1). The interest rate is one percentage point above the underpayment rate.  See I.R.C. 
§ 409A(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
191
 See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II).  
192
 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
193
 See JCT Enron Report, supra note 182 at 40.  It should be noted that the deferral of a deduction does not 
necessarily increase the cost of the compensation.  See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the 
“Time Value of Money”, 95  YALE L.J. 506, 520-24 (1986);  Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, 85 N.C.L. Rev. 571, 
625 (2007). 
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Section 409A has drastically changed the nonqualified deferred compensation landscape 
by imposing a broad range of specific restrictions on everything from making deferral elections 
to receiving distributions.194  If section 409A had been in existence during the time of Enron, and 
if Enron had chosen to comply with its rules, then Enron’s executives generally would not have 
been permitted under the terms of their nonqualified plans to withdraw funds as Enron headed 
toward financial disaster.  This is because of section 409A’s distribution, acceleration, and 
funding requirements.  Under section 409A, a nonqualified plan must restrict the circumstances 
under which a participant can receive distributions from the plan to six events delineated in the 
statute.195  Although one such listed event permits distributions that occur at a time specified 
when the compensation is deferred, another section 409A provision ensures that the specified 
time cannot later be accelerated.196  Section 409A also immediately taxes compensation deferred 
under a plan that allows plan assets to become secured in the event the employer experiences a 
change in financial health.197 
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 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 68 at 3 (referring to section 409A as “direct attempt by Congress to control 
the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation”); Kristen B. Stewart & W. Brent Vanderbrook, Nonqualified 
Deferred Compensation Arrangements After the Enactment of Code §409A, 35 JAN. COLO. LAW. 53 (2006) 
(referring  to 409A as bringing about “significant changes” in taxation of NQDC and opining that Congress had 
“changed virtually every aspect” of taxation of such plans).  Notwithstanding the foregoing, section 409A applies in 
addition to rather than instead of prior deferred compensation tax law.  See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 775, 108th CONG., 
720, 735 (2004).  See also Chason, supra note 186, at 347 (opining that 409A “merely tightens and clarifies the 
doctrines that had already governed executive pensions.”); Richard Ehrhart, Section 409A – Treasury “Newspeak” 
Lost in the “Briar Patch”, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 743-44 (2005) (commenting that Congress had added 
“supplemental requirements to the constructive receipt doctrine” but did not alter or reverse prior law). 
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46 (asserting that problem demonstrated by Enron’s NQDC plans was not NQDC itself but failure of Enron board to 
engage in arm’s-length bargaining); Hussey, supra note 186, at 438 (referring to section 409A as “unwieldy and 
confusing” and asserting that section 409A does little to prevent executives from using NQDC); Yale & Polsky 
supra note 193 (“[T]he federal tax rules governing [deferred] compensation are fundamentally flawed and must be 
extensively overhauled.”); Ethan Yale & Daniel Halperin,  Deferred Compensation Revisited, 114 TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Mar. 5, 2007, at 939-45 (“[With  Section 409A,] [t]axpayers now face extremely complicated rules that are 
focused on the least important considerations and that overlook the most important.”). 
195
 See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(A).  This provision provides that the requirements of section 409A are not met 
unless “the plan provides that compensation deferred under the plan may not be distributed earlier than-- 
         (i) separation from service as determined by the Secretary (except as provided in subparagraph (B)(i)), 
         (ii) the date the participant becomes disabled (within the meaning of subparagraph (C)), 
         (iii) death, 
         (iv) a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule) specified under the plan at the date of the deferral 
of such compensation, 
         (v) to the extent provided by the Secretary, a change in the ownership or effective control of the 
corporation, or in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of the corporation, or 
         (vi) the occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency.” 
In addition, “key employees” of publicly traded corporations may not receive distributions by reason of a 
separation from service “before the date which is 6 months after the date of separation from service (or, if earlier, 
the date of death of the employee).” I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(B). 
196
 See I.R.C. §§ 409A(a)(2)(A)(iv), 409A(a)(3)(prohibiting acceleration except as provided in regulations), 
and Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3. 
197
 See I.R.C. § 409A(b)(2)(A). 
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Although enacted in 2004, the IRS has repeatedly issued transition relief delaying the 
date on which plans must be in compliance with section 409A due to its complexity.  At present, 
the compliance deadline is December 31, 2008.198  It is accordingly too early to determine 
definitively how executives and their employers are reacting to the potential for significant tax 
penalties under section 409A.  Anecdotal evidence does suggest, however, that companies are 
entering into gross-up agreements under which the incidence of any taxes and interest would be 
shifted from the executive to the company.  In the end, companies can choose to provide and 
executives can choose to accept plans that do not meet the requirements of section 409A and thus 
incur the penalties thereunder.   
 
4.  In Summary 
 
None of the tax provisions discussed above were aimed at raising revenue for the federal 
fisc.199  They were instead each aimed at behavior modification to influence aspects of executive 
compensation.  And companies have modified their corporate practices in response to these tax 
penalties, but almost all evidence indicates that they did not do so in the way Congress 
envisioned. 
 
Sections 280G and 4999 were enacted to discourage companies from authorizing golden 
parachute payments above a defined level.  Congress’s stated motivation was to protect 
shareholders from the direct and indirect costs of excessive executive compensation in the form 
of golden parachutes.  But these provisions do not and have not prevented companies from 
authorizing golden parachutes above the limit allowed by the Code without penalty. 
 
Section 162(m) was enacted to discourage public companies from paying compensation 
above a defined level unless it was tied to the company’s performance.  This time Congress was 
motivated to respond to an American public that was angered over immense executive 
compensation packages at a time when many Americans were struggling to make ends meet.   
Nevertheless, according to a recent report prepared for Congress, “[s]tudies have indicated that 
the deduction limitation may have led to some substitution away from salary compensation 
toward performance-based compensation, but that growth in overall executive compensation has 
                                                 
198
 See I.R.S. Notice 2007-78, 2007-41 I.R.B. 780, as revoked and superseded by I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 
2007-46 I.R.B. 990. 
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 “While raising revenue is always a legitimate use of the Code, it does not appear to be the goal which 
Congress is seeking to achieve.” Stabile, supra note 11, at 100 (discussing sections 280G and 162(m)). See also 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 103d CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE 
RECONCILIATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264 (THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993) AS AGREED TO 
BY THE CONFEREES (1993) (forecasting cumulative revenue increase over the first five fiscal years of section 162(m) 
of $335 million); Meegan M. Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation Cap, 62 TAX 
NOTES 747 (1994) (recounting observations of former Treasury benefits tax counsel Catherine Creech that section 
162(m) was “not intended to be a revenue-raising provision, but a behavior-shaping provision”); DEFRA Senate 
Report, supra note 115, at 197 (noting that sections 280G and 4999 were expected to generate less than $5 million in 
revenue); Wolk, supra note 9, at 127 (asserting that golden parachute legislation uses tax code to “discourage certain 
business arrangements” rather than to raise revenue); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF 
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 4520, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004,” Oct. 7, 2004, at 9, 
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-69-04.pdf (estimating Section 409A would bring revenue increase of $158 
million in its first year). 
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not been reduced.”200  Other studies also suggest that, despite a requirement to the contrary, 
compensation levels are not responsive to company performance.   In the end, companies 
continue to pay compensation that is not deductible. 
 
Section 409A was also enacted in response to popular sentiment.  The public was in an 
uproar over Enron’s pay practices in general and its deferred compensation practices in 
particular.  Enron’s deferred compensation practices allowed executives to access their 
retirement plans and deplete Enron’s assets while rank-and-file employees were locked out of 
accessing their retirement plans.  In response, Congress enacted section 409A to discourage 
companies from establishing nonqualified deferred compensation plans that would allow an 
executive to have a significant degree of control over amounts deferred. While it is too early to 
make any certain claims regarding section 409A, prior experience suggests that it will share the 
experience of its predecessors and thus do little to prevent executives from finding a way around 
the rules to whatever end they desire, or else their employers will pay any imposed penalties. 
 
Leading scholars are in agreement that tax legislation attempting to control executive 
compensation has yielded many unintended consequences, but has not reduced overall 
compensation levels or been effective in achieving other legislative goals.  This result would 
ultimately not matter as much if the unintended consequences were of neutral or positive effect.  
A number of scholars, however, have noted the ways in which these unintended consequences 
have created counter-productive tendencies, such as increasing overall compensation paid to 
executives.  In the end, those unintended consequences and any imposed tax penalties end up 
costing the company more.  The next section considers the effects of these additional costs, and 
highlights how, as an overall matter, the provisions have negative effects on people other than 
the highly paid executives, and can even exacerbate the increasing trend of income inequality.  
 
IV.  THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF TAX PENALTIES ON EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
 
For a variety of reasons discussed in the corporate governance literature, corporate boards 
continue to authorize large executive compensation packages that result in the imposition of tax 
penalties.201  These tax penalties increase the company’s expenses: tax penalties that disallow or 
limit a deduction for an expense increase the company’s cost for that item of expense, as do tax 
penalties that impose an additional tax that is paid by the company through the operation of a 
gross-up agreement.202 The company’s expenses are further increased by attendant costs, such as 
the growth of performance-based pay, excess burdens (e.g., transaction costs), and deadweight 
losses.203  Indeed, increased transaction costs are incurred even if a company and its executives 
agree to set compensation at a level and in a manner that avoids the Code’s penalty provisions.  
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 JCT Compensation Report, supra note 4. 
201
 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
202
 See supra Part III. B.  See also generally Polsky, supra note 20. 
203
 See, e.g., ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN & GERALD PRANTE, WHO PAYS TAXES AND WHO RECEIVES 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING? AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL TAX AND SPENDING DISTRIBUTIONS, 1991-
2004 36 (Tax Foundation, Working Paper No. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Tax Foundation Paper] (“In addition to tax 
collections, taxes generally result in what economists refer to as ‘excess burdens’ in the form of tax compliance 
costs, as well as various efficiency losses in the marketplace known as ‘deadweight losses.’”). 
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In that case, the costs will be related to ensuring the compensation package is in fact within the 
delineated boundaries of the penalty provisions, as opposed to costs related to justifying a 
package that falls outside of those boundaries and incurs penalties.204 
 
These additional costs may be counter-balanced by other gains.  It could be argued that 
executive compensation packages that incur penalties but allow for the recruitment and retention 
of preferred CEOs is more economically efficient overall.205  Perhaps companies choosing not to 
observe the Code’s negative incentives are better off for having done so: possibly, after penalties 
are paid, the company has still earned an increased net positive return as compared with other 
scenarios where no penalties are incurred.  But even if that were the case, it would not mean that 
it is the best result that can be achieved.  The company is still incurring economically inefficient 
costs and would presumably be even better off in the absence of the penalties and related costs.  
 
A corporation, however, is a creature of state law, an artificial legal entity that can only 
act through natural persons.206  As such, a corporation cannot bear the ultimate burden (or the 
incidence) of these expenses; only natural persons bear the economic burden.207  The questions 
that remain are which individuals bear the burden and in what proportion.   
 
The literature analyzing who bears the incidence of entity-level taxation, and in what 
proportion, is rich and deep.  Economists have been debating these issues for nearly a century, 
and yet there is very little consensus.208  Most economists generally do agree, however, that there 
are four non-mutually exclusive categories of individuals who could bear the incidence: 
shareholders, owners of capital, consumers, or workers (including vendors and other non-
employees that provide services to the corporation).209   
 
Using the literature regarding the incidence of the corporate tax as a proxy for the 
incidence of increased corporate taxes and other expenses due to tax penalties, these increased 
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 See generally Polsky, supra note 20 (discussing various costs firms might contend with in presence of 
section 162(m) regardless of whether they are ultimately subject to section 162(m)). 
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 See id. at 890.  There, of course, could be less economically motivated reasons as well. See supra note 
201. 
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 See supra note 40. 
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 See supra note 41. 
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 See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 41, at 2 (“While the ultimate incidence of the tax remains somewhat 
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 See OTA Paper, supra note 208, at 1, 4; Pechman, supra note 208, at 141-45.  Owners of capital include 
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costs are also borne in some combination by shareholders, owners of capital, consumers, or 
workers.210  This Part provides a deeper analysis of the individuals in each of these categories 
and considers how the incidence of the tax penalties could affect each of them.  It shows that 
each category is comprised of a diverse group of individuals and thus reveals that, 
notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the incidence literature, the burden likely falls on 
rank-and-file Americans to a substantial extent and does not significantly fall on the executives 
that Congress was targeting with enactment of the penalties.  To the extent targeted executives 
bear a portion of the burden in their capacity as members of these categories, the impact is 
diminished due to its dispersion among the many other individuals in the relevant category or 
categories.211  Thus, the penalties largely miss their mark and fall on individuals that the tax 
penalties did not intend to penalize.212   
 
A.  Incidence in General 
 
Very generally, if shareholders bear the incidence of taxation, they do so in the form of a 
lower rate of return on their equity: meaning, a lower share value or reduced dividend payments.  
Likewise, owners of capital would bear the burden in the form of a lower rate of return on their 
capital assets.  Consumers would bear it in the form of higher prices, and workers in the form of 
lower real wages or layoffs.   
 
Whether, and in what proportion, any of these individuals bear the burden of corporate 
taxes is subject to considerable debate.213  This is because “[t]he actual burden of the corporate 
income tax depends on a complicated set of behavioral reactions to the tax.”214  Nevertheless, an 
identifiable burden must be assumed to allow the federal government or others to conduct tax 
distribution analyses purportedly showing how tax burdens and benefits are distributed across the 
population. 
 
Assumptions regarding the distribution of the corporate tax burden vary by 
organization.215  While the most commonly used assumption is that individuals bear the burden 
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 The corporate tax incidence literature is possibly an imperfect substitute because there is a degree of 
choice present with regard to incurring executive compensation tax penalties that is not available in the pure 
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in proportion to their total capital asset ownership, recent empirical studies “suggest that labor 
may bear a substantial burden.”216   In the end, most economists would agree that owners of 
capital bear some part of the economic burden.217  Many would also agree that at least part, if not 
most, of the burden is shifted at some point to workers (i.e., to labor).218  
 
B.  Shareholders  
 
If a company absorbs the corporate tax, thus lowering the company’s after-tax profits 
(i.e., the bottom line), then its shareholders will initially bear the burden in the form of a smaller 
after-tax return on their corporate equity.219  This would generally occur where an entity-level 
tax was imposed on businesses operating in corporate form assuming that there previously had 
been no such tax imposed under the law.220  In that case, the theory goes, shareholders would not 
be able to shift the tax onto others for a period of time following the imposition of the tax 
because the prices paid for labor and charged for products and services would have already been 
set.221   
 
Just as it is necessary to look past the nominal payor of taxes to determine which 
individual or category of individuals really bears the financial burden, it is necessary to look 
through categories of individuals to learn more about the characteristics of the individuals in that 
group.  Unfortunately, share ownership information is notoriously difficult to come by.222  
Various organizations, however, have conducted surveys or other studies from which it is 
possible to extrapolate share ownership information.  These surveys show that the characteristics 
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of shareholders have changed substantially over the last few decades.223  Americans’ savings 
patterns are a significant contributing factor to these changes. 
 
Since the 1980s, Americans have changed the way in which they invest, or save, for 
retirement, health care, education, and other expenses.224  The country has moved from the 
defined benefit paradigm of employer-provided pensions to a defined contribution paradigm of 
individual saving accounts, such as 401(k) accounts, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), 
health savings accounts (HSAs), and 529 educational savings accounts.225 This means that rank-
and-file Americans, through institutional mediators, are now investing indirectly in public 
companies in ever-greater numbers and amounts. 
 
As recently as 1982, only 20 percent of American households owned stock (directly or 
indirectly).226  Today, by contrast, over 50 percent of American households own stock indirectly 
through an employer-sponsored defined contribution-type plan alone.227  The number of active 
participants in private defined contribution plans has grown from 11 million in 1975 to 52 
million in 2004.228  And those numbers do not include individuals investing in an IRA, a defined 
contribution plan offered by a governmental employer, or other types of savings assets such as 
life insurance or annuities.229 
 
As defined contribution plans have risen in prominence, defined benefit plans have faded 
in prominence.230  The last bastion of defined benefit plans is governmental employers, and even 
there they are beginning to lose favor.231  In 1985 retirement savings assets totaled $2.3 trillion, 
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pension plans as of 1998.” U.S. GOVN’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE 
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of which defined contribution assets were only $0.7 trillion or about 30 percent.232  Today, total 
retirement assets are $17.6 trillion, of which defined contribution assets are $9.2 trillion or 
roughly 52 percent.233  The vast majority of these assets are invested in stock.234  In this way, 
Americans have shifted, along with savings plans, into the role of shareholders, albeit in an 
indirect manner. 
 
Without question, the lowest-income Americans do not significantly participate in share 
ownership, either directly or indirectly.235  Savings in defined contribution tax-preferred vehicles 
“tends to increase with families’ income and net worth.”236  There is also no question, however, 
that the composition of public company shareholders has changed substantially over the course 
of the last few decades.  In 1962, the top 1 percent of wealthiest Americans owned 64 percent of 
public company shares.  By 1998 that figure had dropped to 37 percent.237  During that period, 
middle-income Americans experienced the greatest increase in stock ownership as compared to 
other income classes. 238  As Professor Edward Zelinsky has noted, “the defined contribution 
paradigm is very much a middle and upper-middle class phenomenon.”239   
 
For several reasons, many retirement policy experts expect the increase in defined 
contribution plans vis-à-vis defined benefit plans to continue; there will also likely be an increase 
in participation by the lower-income population.240  To begin, new defined benefit plans are not 
being created.241 Meanwhile, existing defined benefit plans are being terminated or frozen, with 
                                                                                                                                                             
BENEFITS CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS 4 (2008) [hereinafter STATE AND LOCAL 
REPORT].  But, a few states do now “offer defined contribution or other types of plans as the primary retirement 
instrument.”  Id. 
232
 Investment Company Institute, 2008 Investment Company Fact Book 87 Figure 7.1 (2008).  The .7 trillion 
figure does not include investments in fixed and variable annuity reserves at life insurance companies other than 
annuities held by IRAs,  403(b) plans, and 457 plans.  It also does not include defined benefit pension plan assets.  
233
 See id. 
234
 See Equity Ownership, supra note 226, at 1, 10-12. 
235
 Of the nation’s poorest, 11.7 percent do own stock either directly or indirectly.  See Brian K. Bucks, 
Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the 2001 and 
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, 2006, at A19 [hereinafter Survey of Consumer 
Finances Report].  This figure does not include insurance or annuities, which comprise a significant portion of the 
financial assets of low-income Americans.  However, in 1998, households with income of $25,000 or less owned 
only 3.5 percent of public company stock. See NYSE SHARE OWNERSHIP 2000 25, Table 8, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/shareho.pdf [hereinafter NYSE SHARE OWNERSHIP 2000]. 
236
 Survey of Consumer Finances Report, supra note 235, at A24.  Participation and amount of savings also 
increases with level of education, age, marriage, and “white non-Hispanic” ethnicity.  See id.   
237
 See State of Working America, supra note 222, at 263. 
238
 The percentage of stock owned by those in the third and fourth income quintiles increased from 7 percent 
in 1962 to 23 percent in 1998.  See id.  
239
 See Zelinsky, supra note 14, at 39. 
240
 See, e.g., U.S. GOVN’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN SAVINGS MAY 
POSE CHALLENGES TO RETIREMENT SECURITY, ESPECIALLY FOR MANY LOW-INCOME WORKERS 27 (2007) 
[hereinafter GAO SAVINGS REPORT] (“Recent regulatory and legislative changes and proposals could have positive 
effects on DC plan coverage, participation, and savings . . . [and] automatically enrolling new employees in plans as 
a default could have a significant positive impact on DC balances, especially for low-income workers whose jobs 
offer a plan”). 
241
 See State and Local Report, supra note 231. 
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employees being shifted into defined contribution plans.242  Even a few state and local 
governments are moving new hires into defined contribution arrangements.243  
 
There is also a concerted effort underway in both the public and private sectors not only 
to get Americans to save more, but also to get more Americans to start saving, especially lower-
income Americans.244  In 2006, the Pension Protection Act245 made it easier for employers to 
automatically enroll employees in 401(k) defined contribution plans.246  This means that if an 
employee does not want a portion of his or her income to be invested in the plan, he or she needs 
to affirmatively opt out of the plan.  In addition, the default contribution rate must be at least 3 
percent of the individual’s pay, and thereafter must automatically increase 1 percent annually up 
to 6 percent of pay.247  Studies indicate that automatic enrollment, combined with individual 
inertia, will increase participation and savings rates for low and middle-income individuals.248  In 
other words, individuals who might not have actively chosen to participate absent automatic 
enrollment will not take the initiative to withdraw.      
 
The PPA also made permanent the “Saver’s Credit,” which provides a nonrefundable 
credit against federal income tax of up to $1,000 based on contributions made by an eligible low 
or middle-income taxpayer to a retirement savings plan.249  It also authorized the direct payment 
                                                 
242
 See id. 
243
 See id. 
244
 America’s personal savings rate remains one of the lowest among industrialized nations.  See The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Main Economic Indicators (Paris: OECD, Jan. 2004). 
245
 PUB. L. NO. 109-280, 120 STAT. 997 (2006) [hereinafter PPA]. 
246
 PPA at § 902.  The PPA also introduced more stringent defined benefit plan funding rules, which some 
expect will accelerate shifts to defined contribution plans.  See PPA §§ 101, 102, 111, 112, 202, 211, and 212.  See, 
e.g., U.S. GOVN’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES 
TO RETIREMENT SECURITY, ESPECIALLY FOR MANY LOW-INCOME WORKERS 27 (2007) [hereinafter GAO Savings 
Report] (“Recent regulatory and legislative changes and proposals could have positive effects on DC [defined 
contribution] plan coverage, participation, and savings . . . [and] automatically enrolling new employees in plans as 
a default could have a significant positive impact on DC balances, especially for low-income workers whose jobs 
offer a plan”); MCKINSEY & COMPANY, REDEFINING DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 6 (2008) [hereinafter MCKINSEY 
REPORT] (“the [PPA] made substantial changes to DB [defined benefit] ground rules, including reducing interest 
smoothing and introducing more stringent funding requirements. These changes are expected to further accelerate 
the inexorable shift to DC plans.”). 
247
 It has been projected that this and other factors wil1 lead to the doubling of the defined contribution 
market by 2015. See id. at 2. 
248
 See Zelinsky, supra note 14, at 527.  The McKinsey Report predicts that “as early as 2010, the proportion 
of sponsors using auto enrollment and default products will double to about 60 percent,” and “an estimated 80% to 
90% of individuals remain enrolled in their plan.” See supra, note 246, at 6. Among low- and moderate-income 
workers, automatic enrollment typically raises employee 401(k) participation rates from the 60-65% range to the 
85% plus range (Choi et al, National Tax Journal, June 2004). 
Automatic enrollment is not a panacea.  See, e.g., GAO SAVINGS REPORT, supra note 246 (“Research 
suggests that employees exhibit inertia regarding plan participation and contributions, which can reduce DC savings 
by failure to participate or increase savings over time.” ); Emma C. Eriksson, Note, The Pension Protection Act of 
2006:  Is it Too Late to Save Traditional Pension Plans?,  SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 133, 153 (2007) (“[L]ingering 
issues of individuals failing to provide sufficient funding to their accounts and fails to utilize sound investing 
strategies”); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:  Inertia in 401(k) Participation and 
Savings Behavior, CXVI QUARTERLY J. ECON. ISSUE 4, 1149 (Nov. 2001) (noting tendency to retain default 
contribution rate and fund allocation). 
249
 See I.R.C. § 25B and PPA § 812.  The credit phases out and is reduced to zero for married taxpayers filing 
jointly if their adjusted gross income is over $50,000 (indexed for inflation).  See I.R.C. § 25B(b).  Many of those 
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of tax refunds to IRAs upon the taxpayer’s election.250  Further, recently proposed legislation 
“would require employers to automatically enroll employees in a payroll deduction IRA unless 
the employee opts out” to increase savings by workers whose employers do not sponsor a 
retirement plan.251 
 
In the final analysis, even “if universal savings remain admittedly distant, an 
unprecedented transformation of ownership has nonetheless come about.”252  Thus, while a small 
number of super-rich Americans own a significant percentage of public company shares, a large 
and increasing number of rank-and-file Americans, in the aggregate, also indirectly own a 
significant percentage of public company shares.253  In that way, if the tax penalties are borne by 
                                                                                                                                                             
otherwise eligible for the Saver’s Credit, however, do not owe much or any federal income tax and thus cannot 
benefit from a nonrefundable tax credit.  According to one analysis mentioned in the GAO Savings Report, “because 
the credit is nonrefundable, only about 17 percent of those with incomes low enough to qualify for the credit would 
receive any benefit if they contributed to a plan.” Supra note 246 at 36.  For a discussion of the issues affecting the 
retirement savings of low-income Americans, see generally Elizabeth Bell, Adam Carasso, and C. Eugene Steuerle, 
Strengthening Private Resources of Retirement Savings for Low Income Families, (The Urban Inst. Opportunity and 
Ownership Project, No. 5, 2005), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/311229_private_sources.pdf. 
250
 PPA § 830(a). 
251
 See, Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Ways and Means, Neal Announces Hearing on Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and their role in our retirement system, June 19, 2008, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=printfriendly&id=7087 (last visited Aug. 22, 2008) (“Our 
proposal could raise the national savings rate by nearly $8 billion annually.”); H.R. 2167, 110th CONG (2008). 
252
 STEPHEN DAVIS, JON LUKOMNIK, & DAVID PITT-WATSON, THE NEW CAPITALISTS 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch. 
Press 2006) (referring to participants in both defined benefit and defined contribution plans).  Thus far this article 
has only considered defined contribution-type plans because participants in defined contribution plans receive no 
more or less from the plan than the value of their account, which will vary with the performance of its underlying 
investments.  In that way, they are directly affected by share performance and are considered the indirect share 
owners.  Many defined contribution plan participants also have a significant amount of choice in terms of where to 
invest their assets.  Participants of defined benefit plans, on the other hand, are promised a specified sum regardless 
of the investment performance of plan assets.  Defined benefit investment gains and losses accordingly accrue to the 
employer and not the individual participant. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defined benefit plan participants are certainly interested in the investment 
performance of plan assets, and an argument can be made that they should be considered share owners to some 
extent.  See Auerbach, supra note 41, at  6-7 (making such an argument).  Investment losses that trigger significant 
funding liabilities on the part of the employer can threaten the viability of the plan, resulting in the participants 
receiving less than originally promised even though private defined benefit plan participants are insured to some 
extent by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.  Should a public pension plan fail to have sufficient assets to 
meet its obligations, taxpayers would likely be called upon to bail out the plan, in which case there is a wider 
individual interest in public pension plan investment performance. 
253
 See, e.g., NYSE SHARE OWNERSHIP 2000, supra note 235, from which the following table is derived: 
Income Range Percent of 
Shares Owned 
Aggregate 
Under $15,000 0.8 0.8 
$15-$25,000 2.7 3.5 
$25-$50,000 8.9 12.4 
$50-$75,000 13.7 26.1 
$75-$100,000 10.9 37 
$100-$250,000 27.7 64.7 
Over $250,000 35.3 100 
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shareholders then, to a not insignificant extent, they are being borne by the wrong Americans.254  
They were aimed at executives, and they have largely missed that mark.  To the extent targeted 
executives are hit in their capacity as shareholders, the impact is diminished due to its dispersion 
among all shareholders.  This dispersion has a more significant negative impact on rank-and-file 
Americans because generally their share value is a higher percentage of their overall wealth. 
 
Moreover, the intended beneficiaries of the tax penalty provisions were either 
shareholders, rank-and-file Americans, or both.255  These are the very individuals who are 
potentially bearing the actual burden of a penalty that was not meant to penalize them.  It is thus 
ironic that Congress encourages Americans to prepare for their retirement needs by investing 
their assets largely in public companies through the mutual funds offered in their retirement plan 
or IRA. 
 
C.  Capital Owners 
 
Famed economist Arnold C. Harberger’s seminal equilibrium incidence model theorized 
that, over time, the incidence of the corporate tax would shift to all owners of capital, as the tax 
caused investment patterns to adjust back and forth between investments where the corporate tax 
is present and where it is not.256  More specifically, under certain assumptions, the lower after-
tax return on corporate equity would prompt investors to move their capital into non-corporate 
investments.  The increase in non-corporate investment and the concomitant decrease in 
corporate investment would, in turn, cause the return on non-corporate investments to fall and 
corporate investments to rise.257  Some investments would then be shifted back to the corporate 
sector until equilibrium is achieved and the after-tax return on corporate and non-corporate 
investment is the same.258  In that way, “all capital, not just corporate capital, [] bears the tax.”259   
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 Although a large number of those rank-and-file Americans are investing through tax-preferred savings 
vehicles, they can nevertheless bear the incidence in the form of a lower retirement account balance because of 
either lower dividend payouts or lower share value. 
255
 See supra Part III.B (discussing various tax penalty provisions). 
256
 See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962).  
Harberger’s model assumes capital is freely mobile within a closed-economy, meaning capital does not flow 
between countries.  
257
 See id.  The return on corporate investments is presumed to rise in relation to charging “higher prices for 
the reduced supply of goods produced by corporations.”  Lyon, supra note 210, at 51 
258
  See Harberger, supra note 256.  See also Lyon, supra note 210, at 52 (discussing significance of this 
finding).  This argument becomes more complicated in a world of international capital markets (i.e., an open-
economy).  If capital can be invested anywhere in the world, then in theory the burden of corporate taxes cannot be 
borne by capital because it can move to other countries where a greater rate of return can be earned.  Thus, to 
maintain corporate profit and thereby capital investment, corporations must either increase revenues by raising 
prices or decrease expenses by paying less for its factors of production.  See generally Pechman, supra note 208, at 
143-44.  See also generally Arnold C. Harberger, The ABCs of Corporation Tax Incidence: Insights into the Open-
Economy Case, TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 51-73 (1995); Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the 
Corporation Income Tax Revisited, National Tax Journal, 305-6 (June 2008).  Notwithstanding the foregoing, “some 
open-economy models have found similar results” as Harberger’s closed-economy model.  Tax Foundation Paper, 
supra note 203, at 86. See also Gravelle & Smetters, supra note 208.  The equilibrium theory still has its critics, 
though.  See generally OTA Paper, supra note 208, at 19. 
259
 Auerbach, supra note 41, at 8 (describing Harberger model).  Conversely, shareholders alone may bear the 
tax in the long run if investment can be financed through debt, the interest on which is deductible, instead of equity.  
See Pechman, supra note 208, at 144.   In the long run, the tax may also be shifted to consumers or workers.  See 
OTA Paper, supra note 208, at 26. 
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More data has been collected, and distributional analyses prepared, for this category of 
individuals than any other.  As such, the burden of the corporate income tax is presented in the 
table below in three different ways, providing different perspectives from which to consider the 
data.  The table first provides the percentage of a household’s total tax burden that went to pay 
the corporate tax.  Next, the table shows the effective (or average) rate of tax paid by each 
quintile on corporate income.  Finally, it shows the portion of the total corporate tax burden 
borne by each quintile.  The income quintiles are based on comprehensive household income, 
meaning the figures include, inter alia, the value of government transfer payments and in-kind 
benefits such as food stamps and housing assistance.   
 
Quintiles of Comprehensive Household Income (2004) 
 Bottom 20% 
(up to 
$17,699) 
Second 20% 
($17,700 to 
$30, 199) 
Third 20% 
($30,200 to 
$44,599) 
Fourth 20% 
($44,600 to 
$66,499) 
Top 20% 
($66,500 
and over) 
Top 1% 
($276,200 
and over) 
Percentage 
of Overall 
Tax Burden 
9.0% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0% 17% 30% 
Effective 
Tax Rate 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 4.2% 9.5% 
Share of 
Corporate 
Tax 
0.6% 1.5% 3.0% 6.5% 87.3% 58.6% 
Source: Congressional Budget Office260  
 
Based on the foregoing data, whether the corporate tax is considered fair depends on 
one’s perspective and normative tax policy philosophy.  From an “ability to pay” perspective, the 
corporate tax does not look terribly fair to the individuals in the lowest-income quintile as a 
significantly greater share of their tax burden went to pay the corporate tax than the next three 
income quintiles.  The corporate tax looks steeply progressive, however, from the perspective of 
each quintile’s share of the tax because it rises from 0.6 percent to 87.3 percent.  Even so, close 
to 50 percent of the burden in 2004 was borne by individuals outside of the executive class (i.e., 
those with comprehensive household income of $276,199 or less).  In the middle of the fairness 
spectrum is the effective tax rate that applies to the corporate income of each quintile.  In that 
case, the rate rises gradually until the top quintile. 
                                                 
260
 See HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 to 2005 (using 2004 data), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8885/EffectiveTaxRates.shtml. These numbers change significantly if 
different assumptions are used.  For example, the following table divides the income quintiles on a cash money basis 
and provides the results based on the assumption that roughly 70 percent of the corporate tax is borne by labor and 
30 percent is borne by owners of capital: 
 Quintiles of Household Cash Money Income (2004) 
 Bottom 20% Second 20% Third 20% Fourth 20% Top 20% 
Percentage of 
Overall Tax 
Burden 
6.3% 8.4% 8.2% 8.2% 8.1% 
Effective Tax Rate .81% 1.94% 2.31% 2.57% 2.78% 
Share of 
Corporate Tax 
3.4% 10.0% 15.1% 22.8% 48.7% 
Source: Tax Foundation Paper, supra note 203. 
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Accordingly, if increased corporate taxes from tax penalties are dispersed to all owners of 
capital like the corporate tax in general, then such taxes, while borne in greater proportion by the 
wealthy, are also borne by those who are less well off.261  With regard to the latter, increased 
corporate taxes cause the less well off greater harm from the perspective of their ability to 
shoulder the burden.262  They also run counter to Congress’s pro-savings policies. 
 
D.  Consumers  
 
The extent to which the corporate tax can be shifted forward to consumers in the form of 
higher prices is subject to considerable debate in the economic literature and there are a number 
of conflicting theories among economists.263  One theory assumes markets are perfectly 
competitive and focuses on a company’s response to shifts in available capital as a result of 
increased taxes.  If the corporate tax induces reduced rates of return that push capital toward non-
corporate investments where a higher rate of return can be earned,264 then the resultant 
contraction of capital theoretically results in less productivity (i.e., less supply) and thus higher 
prices in the corporate sector.265  There should also be a concomitant reduction in prices for non-
corporate products in response to the capital infusion and resultant increased supply of goods.266  
This model, accordingly, is comprised of individual consumers who are better off as a result of 
lower prices and other consumers who are worse off as a result of higher prices.267  The 
incidence of the corporate tax, however, supposedly has not shifted to consumers here because as 
a class their total expenditures do not change, only the distribution of their expenditures among 
class members.268   
 
An alternative theory considers the extent to which consumers are able and willing to 
substitute a lower priced product for a higher priced product or simply choose not to buy a 
product or a replacement.269  Some have argued that, in an ideal world of perfectly competitive 
markets and profit-maximizing firms, companies should not be able to raise prices to reflect 
higher taxes without losing sales and thus lowering profits.270  Others, who acknowledge the real 
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 See Lyon, supra note 210 (noting similarity of analysis between corporate tax incidence and differences in 
tax payments among corporations for various reasons). 
262
 It should be noted that “ability to pay” is a normative tax policy notion. 
263
 See M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 1-3 (1963); see 
also Pechman, supra note 208, at 143 (describing the debate); Klein, supra note 208, at 577-85 (same). 
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  See supra Part IV.C. 
265
  The higher prices, in turn, ultimately increase the return on corporate investments.  See Klein, supra note 
208 at 577. 
266
 See Lyon, supra note 210, at 51. 
267
 See Klein, supra note 208, at 583; Lyon, supra note 210, at 51. 
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 See id. “Consumers of goods produced in the corporate sector are made worse off by the higher prices for 
these goods.  At the same time, consumers of goods produced by the other sectors of the economy are made better 
off because of the greater supply of goods produced by these sectors.  The net effect of these changes on 
progressivity is difficult to assess, because individuals in all income groups consume goods produced by both 
sectors.  As a first approximation, price effects might be assumed to have little overall impact on incidence.” Id. 
269
 See Pechman, supra note 208, at 143. 
270
 See Klein, supra note 208, at 584-585; J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 35 
(1974). 
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world may be less than ideal, have argued  “companies have the ability to pass taxes forward and 
set what they consider to be reasonable prices.”271 
 
In theory, a company’s pre-existing customer base could absorb increased taxes by 
continuing to buy the company’s product at its higher price.  This would be the case if there were 
no suitable substitution for the product and the company’s consumers were unwilling to forego 
purchasing the product.272  In the specific context of increased corporate costs due to tax 
penalties on executive compensation, the characteristics of the individuals who ultimately bear 
the burden depend to some extent on the nature of the product.  For example, if the company 
produces exclusively high-end products, then its customers are likely well off.  If instead, the 
company produces exclusively low-end products, then the majority of its customers are likely 
less well off.  In the real world, most public companies provide a mix of products and thus have 
a mixed customer base that, demographically speaking, likely includes a significant number of 
rank-and-file Americans.273 
 
On the other hand, a company’s customers could be willing to forego purchasing its 
product entirely even though there is no substitute for it.274  In this situation, the increased taxes 
cannot be shifted to the company’s consumers.  Instead, the company must establish a price point 
that maintains a customer base (or level of demand) sufficient to offset the increased taxes plus 
loss of revenue from departing customers or customers who buy less.275  Unless that balance can 
be found, some of the tax will be shifted to the other categories of individuals.  Likewise, if 
consumers could substitute a lower priced product from another company for the higher priced 
product, the increased taxes could not be shifted entirely to the company’s consumers, and 
instead must be borne by other categories of individuals. 
 
In the end, given America’s demographics and the mass production of multiple product 
lines by many large public companies, to the extent increased corporate taxes due to tax penalties 
on executive compensation can be shifted to consumers instead of others, then it is likely rank-
and-file Americans bear the burden in some not insignificant way.  
 
E.  Workers 
 
Lastly, a company can shift corporate taxes backward by paying less for its non-capital 
factors of production, the most significant of which is labor.276   
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 See KRZYZANIAK & MUSGRAVE, supra note 263.  See also Klein, supra note 208, at 584-585. 
272
 See Gravelle & Smetters, supra note 208, at 3 (arguing that domestic capital may bear the burden of a 
corporate income tax in an open economy where there is imprfect product substitution). 
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 See Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments:  Who Should Ultimately 
Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 857 (1996).  This does presume a minimally 
sufficient level of income to be able to absorb the higher price. Lower-income Americans are also the most likely 
income group to be most affected by, and thus avoid, higher prices. 
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 TAXING OURSELVES, supra note 29, at 74. 
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 See id. 
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 See Lindsey, supra note 211, at n.199 (“If the corporate tax is borne by employees in the form of lower 
compensation, the CEOs and other high-ranking corporate executives seem to escape this financial burden.”).  It 
should be noted that, under some models, labor may not be affected by increased corporate taxes.  For example, if 
demand for particular consumer goods is highly inelastic, then prices should rise instead.  See Gravelle & Smetters, 
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There are two alternative theories regarding the manner in which the corporate income 
tax may affect workers.277  The first theory assumes markets are perfectly competitive and 
focuses on a company’s response to shifts in available capital as a result of increased taxes.278  
Here, the effect on labor of changes in capital intensity is not all that dissimilar in a closed or 
open economy.  In a closed-economy, the corporate tax induces reduced rates of return that result 
in the movement of capital to companies where a higher rate of return can be earned.279  The 
resultant contraction of capital results in less productivity and thereby reduced wages.280  In an 
open-economy, “[i]f capital is mobile (and labor is immobile) across jurisdictions, then labor’s 
share of the tax burden can be high.”281 
 
The second theory recognizes that, outside of economic models, markets may be less than 
perfectly competitive.  In that case, there may be some room for workers and employers to 
negotiate how the corporate tax burden is allocated.282  That allocation will depend on the 
relative elasticities of the parties.283 
 
If labor can be outsourced or moved to another country, then Americans who work in 
affected industries would likely bear a greater portion of the burden.  It could be in the form of 
unemployment or reduced wages due to a flood of employees creating or contributing to a 
competitive market for remaining jobs utilizing workers with that particular skill-set.  Even if it 
is assumed that a company cannot move its labor force to a cheaper location, workers could still 
bear a greater portion of the burden if the job market is competitive.  In that case, it would not be 
easy for these workers to find better paying jobs or, similarly, their jobs could easily be filled 
with workers willing to earn the same or less.284  A similar result obtains if, from a practical 
perspective, the workforce is not terribly mobile and thus captive.285   
 
Alternatively, in the unlikely event reduced wages caused workers to decide en masse 
that they prefer leisure over low wages and to accordingly leave the workforce, the resultant 
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 See OTA Paper, supra note 208, at 6, 23. 
279
 See supra Part IV.C. 
280
 See OTA Paper, supra note 208, at 6 . 
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Chapter 1 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007).  
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 See OTA Paper, supra note 208 at 6 & 23. 
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 See id. 
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 See id. 
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lower supply of workers with a particular skill-set could create greater demand and thus 
increased wages for workers in those industries.286  If that were the case, the burden would have 
to be shifted to or shared with other categories of individuals.  Similarly, with an elastic and 
mobile labor market, the corporate tax could not be shifted onto workers because theoretically 
they would leave the company for better paying jobs elsewhere.  
 
In recent years, empirical research has suggested ever more strongly that labor bears a 
significant portion, if not all, of the corporate tax.287  Extending those results to increased 
corporate taxes due to tax penalties on executive compensation, then, means that the burden is 
also borne significantly by rank-and-file Americans.  On a purely quantitative basis, at any given 
large public company, the vast majority of workers do not belong to the executive class.  
 
F.  In Summary 
 
The foregoing is quite simplified and does not account for every possible scenario or 
interaction among categories.  As observed by one scholar: “the problem of tracing any of the 
various consequences of the tax is exceedingly complex, involving virtually endless 
interrelationships between narrower, but still thorny and unresolved, problems from almost every 
subfield of economics.”288  Nonetheless, two patterns emerge:  (1) the incidence of increased 
corporate taxes and other expenses is a zero-sum situation among the categories of individuals 
who could possibly bear the burden, and (2) rank-and-file Americans comprise a substantial 
portion of each category of individuals.  Thus, even though the data and theoretical economic 
models are inconclusive, it does not matter to a significant extent for purposes of this article 
precisely where the burden falls.  In each scenario, rank-and-file Americans, along with super-
rich executives and other members of that class, ultimately bear the burden of the executive 
compensation tax penalties either as shareholders, owners of capital, consumers, or workers.289 
 
It could be argued that this finding is unimportant because the tax penalties are causing 
only trivial harm.290  At present, only section 162(m) could apply on a yearly or regular basis: 
section 409A has not gone into effect yet although it could thereafter apply on a yearly basis, and 
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the golden parachute provisions are only triggered by a change in control.  Further, section 
162(m) applies only to a small subset of executives.291  Additionally, the tax penalties have 
significantly less impact on corporations with net operating losses that do not owe taxes.292  
Thus, the amount of revenue raised by the tax penalty provisions aimed at shaping executive 
compensation might only take pennies from each individual bearing the burden.293   
 
The economic costs of the tax penalties, however, are not limited to the amount of 
revenue raised.294  Further, the amount of revenue raised for the fisc may presently be small, but 
that may not always be the case.  The tax penalty burden could rise significantly in the not too 
distant future if current legislative proposals expanding the reach of sections 162(m) and 409A 
are successfully enacted.295 
 
History shows that these proposals are not likely to reduce overall executive 
compensation levels.  They can, however, increase a company’s compensation costs and thereby 
penalize individuals other than the targeted executives. Indeed, in contrast to prior motivations in 
enacting tax penalties on executive compensation, proponents of these proposals tout their 
revenue raising capability. And they may only be the beginning of legislative efforts to raise 
money in ways that seem fair, such as taxing super-rich executives.296   
 
Perceptions, however, do not always conform with reality.  To answer the central 
question of this article, no one can be certain precisely who is harmed by the tax penalties on 
executive compensation, but it is likely a large and varied group of individuals that includes 
many rank-and-file Americans.  This answer, in turn, raises the question whether anyone other 
than executives should bear the burden, and whether the answer to that question changes if the 
tax penalties ultimately produce only a micro burden on other affected individuals.  The answer 
to both of these questions should be no. 
 
Even if the tax penalties have only a micro-effect, they are still raising revenue from the 
wrong people.  The amount of harm produced at the individual level should be relatively 
unimportant.  More important is that, collectively, rank-and-file Americans bear a significant 
portion of the economic burden instead of executives who are the target of these tax penalties.  
Furthermore, because public criticism of executive compensation practices was significant 
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enough to get Congressional attention in the first place, the impact of any resultant legislation 
should not be dismissed as trivial any more than the public would accept dismissing the original 
issue as trivial. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
At times like the present, executives are pilloried if they appear unaffected by, or to be 
profiting in some way from or even contributing to, the economic distress felt by most 
Americans.297  Public opinion seems to insist that legislators “do something” in response.  In 
recent times, that response tends to take the form of tax penalties aimed at executive 
compensation.  
 
Tax penalties on executive compensation may be good politics, but they are an 
inappropriate policy tool that should no longer be used.  Legal scholars are in general agreement 
that these provisions have not been effective in reducing overall executive compensation levels 
or other legislative goals.298  Furthermore, some have shown that tax penalties in general and 
those imposed on executive compensation in particular are inefficient behavior deterrents.299  
Importantly, this article shows that they also cause indiscriminate injuries to a large number of 
citizens, including those who are far from being members of the super-rich executive class, and 
thus they are also inequitable.300   
 
This does not mean, however, that the federal government should not pursue methods of 
controlling executive compensation if that is deemed a desirable goal: only that it should aim 
better to hit its intended target.  Indeed, the repeal of existing tax penalties should only be done 
in the context of other complementary reforms to prevent executives of the companies freed from 
these costs from capturing the resultant savings for their own benefit.  Although tax penalties do 
not thus far appear to be an effective restraint, that does not mean that other types of restraint 
should not be pursued.301 
 
If Congress truly wants to do something about excessive executive compensation levels, 
it could target the compensation directly by, for example, imposing criminal penalties on 
executives receiving compensation in violation of whatever rules it establishes.302  Although 
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such action may be extreme, less severe forms of direct action are also problematic because 
direct action conflicts with widely held American laissez-faire, meritocratic and entrepreneurial 
ideals.  Congress could perhaps flip its current approach and positively incentivize desirable 
compensation structures, but implementing an effective, equitable, and administrable system 
could prove difficult.  
 
Alternatively, Congress could undertake efforts to deal with the root problems giving rise 
to popular sentiments regarding executive compensation levels instead of legislation aimed at the 
symptoms of these problems.  The root problems appear to include economic polarity (i.e., 
extreme wealth and income disparities) combined with economic turmoil.  It is difficult, 
however, for legislators even to mention much less enact the types of policies that would deal 
with rather than obscure those issues: for example, a more progressive income tax rate structure, 
eliminating capital gains tax preferences, payroll tax reforms, income tax base broadening 
through loophole closures, or strengthening the transfer tax system. 
 
Even if tax penalties aimed at executive compensation were effective (which this article 
shows they are not) at reducing levels of compensation and other legislative goals, they would do 
little if anything to help average Americans struggling to get by in times of economic turmoil.  
Of course, the irony is that these struggles were the catalyst for enactment of the tax penalties in 
the first place.303  To be sure, there were additional reasons for each provision enacted.304  But, in 
each case, Congress was also motivated to respond to rank-and-file Americans upset over 
executive compensation excesses.  
 
More troubling is the realization that in some way rank-and-file Americans bear a 
remarkable portion of the economic burden instead of executives who are the target of these tax 
penalties.  While a small number of super-rich Americans do bear a significant percentage of the 
burden, a large number of rank-and-file Americans, in the aggregate, also bear a significant 
percentage of the burden.  Thus, the costs of the penalties are effectively a tax increase on rank-
and-file Americans in addition to wealthier Americans.   
 
Even worse, the operative effect of the tax penalties runs counter to the federal 
government’s retirement savings policies if the harm is indeed borne to some extent by 
shareholders or owners of capital.  Congress foregoes significant tax revenues in order to 
encourage Americans to prepare for their retirement needs by investing largely in public 
companies through the mutual funds offered in their tax-preferred retirement plans or IRAs.305 
But the goal of retirement security is undermined if plan asset values are depressed to some 
extent as a result of the tax penalties. 
 
Setting aside for now the important questions regarding whether the growing income 
inequality problem can be solved by targeting executive compensation or whether it is 
appropriate to attempt to control the market for executives, at a minimum the government ought 
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not harm those whom it is endeavoring to help.  This article demonstrates that Congress did 
exactly that when it enacted tax penalties on executive compensation. 
